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ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC DEMAND, PRICING AND INVESTMENT
JIAXUAN LI
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2016
Major Professor: Marc Rysman, Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
My dissertation develops and applies empirical structural models to study consumers’
dynamic adoption of durable goods, and firms’ dynamic research and development (R&D)
investment and pricing strategies. In Chapter 2, I study consumer purchase dynamics for a
new technology good, the digital single-lens-reflex (DSLR) camera, where consumer learning
and switching costs across brands are present. Using a unique dataset that tracks individual
DSLR camera ownership history, I find that low-end DSLR cameras are gateway products
that most consumers buy initially. When some consumers choose to repurchase, they are
more likely to buy high-end DSLR cameras from the same brand as the initial purchases.
Combining individual camera ownership data with aggregate sales data, I develop and
estimate a dynamic demand model that incorporates consumer learning and switching
costs. The estimated demand model implies a dynamic complementary relationship between
high- and low-end products that are produced by the same firm. In Chapter 3, I further
empirically investigate the influence of consumer purchase dynamics on forward-looking
firms’ pricing strategies. Supply-side simulations imply that firms have incentives to invest
in their customer bases using low-end products and to harvest the resolved uncertainty of
valuation and switching costs using high-end products. In Chapter 4, I explore the nature
of uncertainty in innovation production through firms’ R&D investment. Utilizing a rich
dataset that tracks Spanish manufacture firms’ R&D activities and innovation outcomes for
up to 17 years, I build and estimate a dynamic model of firms’ R&D investment incorporates
the uncertainties in innovation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The three chapters of this dissertation are unified by two common interests: first, the interest
of modeling economic agents’ decision-making in an explicitly dynamic setting; second,
the interests of exploiting detailed micro-level data to motivate the modeling. Consumer
demand can be dynamic when products are durable, and when switching costs or consumer
learning are present. In addition, firms’ pricing and R&D investment decisions have dynamic
implications when we allow demand dynamics and when there are suck costs.
In “Gateway Products in the DSLR Camera Market: Dynamic Demand, Consumer
Learning and Switching Costs”, I study consumer purchase dynamics for new technology
goods, where consumer learning and switching costs across brands are present. I further
empirically investigate the influence of consumer purchase dynamics on forward-looking
firms’ pricing strategies. In markets for new technology goods such as the DSLR camera
industry, first-time buyers face uncertainty about their own usage and valuation of the
products. In addition, consumers typically invest in brand-specific complementary goods
using the acquired cameras (e.g., they buy multiple lenses), making it hard to switch to
another brand when repurchasing. Using a unique dataset that tracks individual DSLR
camera ownership history, I find that low-end DSLR cameras are gateway products that most
consumers buy initially. When some consumers choose to repurchase, they are more likely
to buy high-end DSLR cameras from the same brand as the initial purchases. Combining
individual camera ownership data with aggregate sales data, I develop and estimate a
dynamic demand model that incorporates consumer learning and switching costs. The
estimation reveals that two consumer types, “enthusiastic” and “neutral” consumers, differ
2greatly in their valuation of high-end cameras ex-post. Enthusiastic consumers’ repurchases
are crucial for the sales of high-end DSLR cameras. The estimated demand model implies a
dynamic complementary relationship between high- and low-end products that are produced
by the same firm. Supply-side simulations imply that firms have incentives to invest in
their customer bases using low-end products and to harvest the resolved uncertainty of
valuation and switching costs using high-end products.
In “A Model of Dynamic R&D Investment with Uncertain Innovation”, I utilize a rich
dataset that tracks Spanish manufacture firms’ R&D activities and innovation outcomes for
up to 17 years, I build and estimate a dynamic model of firms’ R&D investment. The model
incorporates linkages between knowledge capital stock, innovation and quality evolution.
I simulate a counterfactual policy that allows me to analyze how firms respond to R&D
subsidies.
Chapter 2
Gateway Products in the DSLR Camera Market:
Dynamic Demand, Consumer Learning and
Switching Costs
2.1 Introduction
In markets for new technology durable goods, consumers typically face a range of products
at different levels of quality offered by multiple firms. When choosing products to buy,
first-time buyers face uncertainty about their own usage and valuation of the products.
Similar to experience goods, consumers need to learn how often they use or how they
value these products; this learning often will not take place until consumption. In addition,
consumers foresee that they may wish to upgrade their devices and purchase add-ons,
usually from the same firm. How will consumers purchase products in this environment of
learning, potential upgrades and switching costs across brands?1
Consumer purchase patterns in this environment have important implications for product
pricing. Firms may price some introductory products at a relatively low markup to attract
new customers. Many first-time buyers will repurchase upgraded products from the same
firms. These products usually share similar design and compatible features with the
introductory products. Thus by investing in enlarging the customer base, firms hope to
lure high-valuation consumers into their “ecosystem”: the range of quality-differentiated
1Note that consumer learning in my context means consumers gather private information about their own
usage or valuation/types. Consumers know only the distribution of their valuation/types before purchase;
they learn their actual valuation after purchase.
4products and add-ons. For example, since 2008 an entry-level Canon digital single-lens-reflex
(DSLR) camera has been priced below $500, and has a reputation of break-even price in the
market. Once consumers find themselves enthusiastic about DSLR cameras and want to
upgrade, they may need to spend more than $3000 for professional Canon cameras. Apple
iPod touch is another example. For instance, the 5th-generation iPod Touch was priced less
than half of the price of the 5th-generation iPhone. Surveys show that many iPod Touch
users will upgrade to Apple’s latest iPhone.2 The consumer service Evernote provides more
extreme pricing patterns. Evernote offers basic products for free. 11% of first-time users
will upgrade to the professional versions in two years.3 Questions arise: when there are
consumer learning and costs of switching brands, how will firms price products taking into
account the likelihood that consumers will repurchase/upgrade? Does this pricing help or
hurt consumers?
To address these questions, I develop a structural dynamic demand model and empirically
investigate the influence of consumer purchase dynamics on firms’ pricing strategies in the
DSLR camera market.4 The DSLR camera market is a good environment to study demand
dynamics: here, consumer learning and switching costs go hand in hand. Consumers
typically invest in brand-specific complementary goods using the acquired cameras (e.g.,
they buy multiple lenses), making it hard to switch to another brand when repurchasing. I
construct a novel dataset that tracks individual DSLR camera ownership transitions. These
were recovered from information from 6 million photo observations from DSLR camera
users on the website Flickr.5 The data show that low-end DSLR cameras are gateway
products that most consumers buy initially. Among first-time buyers, low-end camera users
who will repurchase use their cameras more often than those who will not repurchase. In
2Source: the mobile device ownership 2011 survey conducted by Museum of Science and Industry,
Chicago.
3Source: http://allthingsd.com/20131226/evernote-ceo-phil-libin-on-turning-loyal-users-into-paying- cus-
tomers/
4In this market, Canon and Nikon are the leading players. Other smaller players are Olympus, Sony
and Pentax. This paper focuses on the two leading firms in demand modeling and estimation. The pricing
simulation is also modeled in a Canon-Nikon duopoly.
5For each photo, I can observe the model of the DSLR camera used as well as the time when the picture
was taken. Thus I am able to recover the DSLR camera ownership history from the photo observations.
5addition, consumers who repurchase are more likely to buy high-end DSLR cameras from
the same brand as the initial purchases. First, motivated by observed data patterns, I
develop and estimate a structural dynamic demand model that explicitly incorporates (1)
consumer learning and (2) the cost of switching brands when repurchasing. Then, I study
how consumers respond to price changes by calculating price elasticities and analyzing the
complex implications of these elasticity dynamics. Finally, using the estimated demand
system, I simulate alternative competitive environments and numerically solve for stylized
firms’ pricing strategies.
I find that consumer learning and switching costs across brands play an important role in
consumers’ purchasing dynamics as well as firms’ pricing strategies. First, demand estimates
reveal that two consumer types, “enthusiastic” and “neutral” consumers, significantly differ
in their unobserved valuations of high-end cameras ex-post. Because consumers are uncertain
about their valuation/types before purchase, most start with low-end cameras at attractive
prices. Enthusiastic consumers who have already learned their types are likely to repurchase
expensive high-end cameras.6 Enthusiastic consumers’ repurchases will gradually become
crucial for the sales of high-end cameras, as the uncertainties of consumer types are resolved
through consumer learning over time. I also find that switching costs are quantitatively
important. The average switching cost is about 12% of the average price of a DSLR camera.
Second, I analyze price elasticities of the estimated demand system to study long-
term impacts of a permanent price change. In this environment, enthusiastic and neutral
consumers exhibit big differences in demand elasticities and dynamic consumption patterns.
For example, given a permanent 1% price increase uniformly among low-end Canon cameras,
the sales of high-end Canon cameras to neutral consumers increase to about 1.4%. However,
the overall sales of high-end Canon cameras to enthusiastic consumers increase only in the
first 8 months after the price change but decrease over time, bottoming out at −0.6% by
the end of the time. This is because, after the price change, many price-sensitive consumers
6At the same time, foreseeing potential future upgrade, a few consumers are willing to initially purchase
high-end cameras that they wish to grow into. These consumers may, however, actually find themselves the
neutral type and may repurchase another low-end camera instead.
6will choose not to purchase or to delay their purchase of low-end Canon cameras. Thus, this
demand system will end up with a smaller customer base of low-end Canon camera holders.
Fewer enthusiastic consumers will learn their types through purchase, and fewer of these
consumers will purchase high-end Canon or Nikon cameras in the long run, leading to the
decreasing elasticities of high-end cameras among enthusiastic consumers. Due to switching
costs across brands, the impact on the decreasing sales of high-end Canon cameras is larger
than that of high-end Nikon cameras. For this 1% price increase of low-end Canon cameras,
the overall sale of high-end Canon cameras will decrease to about −0.4% to −0.5% by the
end of the time. As a result, the estimated demand model implies a dynamic complementary
relationship of low-end and high-end products produced by the same firm. This is the key
demand side finding that drives the supply-side pricing results.
Finally, using demand estimates and a stylized supply model, I explore the consequences
of the demand dynamics on firms’ pricing strategies. First, I find that, due to the complemen-
tary relationship on the demand side, forward-looking firms have incentives to invest in their
customer bases using low-end products. Firms can then harvest the resolved uncertainty
of valuation and switching costs using high-end products. Second, I find that increasing
switching costs between brands leads the optimal prices of low-end (high-end) products
to decrease (increase). This result means that switching costs increase the incentives of
firms to invest in their customer bases to accelerate consumer learning. When the switching
cost is 10 times the estimated value, firms compete so fiercely in pricing low-end/gateway
products that, for example, Canon is even willing to price its low-end product below the
marginal cost. This aggressive pricing of low-end products drives consumers to adopt DSLR
cameras and increases consumers’ welfare. In addition, the quality of high-end products
determines firms’ competitiveness in the high-switching-cost environment. Third, I find a
merger leads the firms to reduce the number of products. The merger also drives down the
price of the low-end product, while the price of the high-end product rises.
The novelty of my model is that it integrates both consumer learning and switching
costs into a dynamic demand framework for durable goods in order to predict the resulting
7observed patterns of consumer choice. I assume that a consumer who has never purchased
a DSLR camera before does not know in advance her subjective valuation of using the
advanced cameras. A consumer learns her valuation/type by purchasing a camera, which
causes her to behave differently when considering her repurchase decisions. In addition, a
consumer pays costs if she switches to a new brand when repurchasing. Every period, a
forward-looking consumer chooses whether or not to purchase a DSLR camera, forming
perceptions of future market states. When a new camera is purchased, the utility that
depends on characteristics of the camera model comes upfront at the moment of purchase.
In addition, after purchase, the camera in inventory delivers flow utility each period.
A key to the simplicity of the model is in the flow utility from the camera in inventory.
This flow utility is assumed to depend only on two factors: the product-line group of the
camera model (low-end or high-end) and the consumer’s type. This assumption simplifies
the state space of the consumer’s problem. Its advantage is that I am able to break down
consumer choice into two separate components: 1) a static problem of choosing camera
models conditioning on brand and product-line group choices; 2) a dynamic problem of
choosing brands and product-line groups. To estimate the model, I combine aggregate
monthly sales data (1999 - 2006) in the US DSLR camera market with micro-level camera
ownership transition data from Flickr. I embed the Micro BLP-style (see Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes (2004)) estimation approach to match the model predictions of conditional
dynamic choice probabilities to the moments in Flickr data, in addition to match the market
shares using the BLP moments (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995); Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2012)). I choose this approach because, from the aggregate sales data, repeated
purchases can not be distinguished from initial purchases, nor can individual purchase history
be observed. Thus, in order to study consumer learning and switching dynamics, I need to
supplement the sales data with information on individual-level camera ownership transitions.
For example, identification of the switching cost is obtained by matching the probabilities
that consumers choose previous brands conditional on repurchasing. Identification of
consumer learning is obtained by matching the changing probabilities that consumers
8choose product-line groups in initial purchases and in later repurchases.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, this paper sheds light on the role
of vertically-differentiated products in a dynamic environment using observable data. A
dynamic perspective reveals complementarity between low-end and high-end products that
are produced by the same firm. This dynamic complementarity brings firms new dynamic
product-line pricing incentives, in addition to the static price discrimination incentives.
Given demand estimates and simulation, I am able to quantify the relative importance of
firms’ static and dynamic pricing incentives. I find that a forward-looking Canon gives up
12.9% of markup selling low-end DSLR cameras, and a forward-looking Nikon gives up
7.2% of markup selling low-end DSLR cameras. Second, I develop a demand framework
for modeling the adoption of durable goods with consumer learning and switching costs.
Allowing heterogeneous consumers to learn about their preferences through purchases
is central to revealing the dynamic complementarity relationship between low-end and
high-end products on the demand side. This model also helps obtain more accurate price
elasticities, which are important ingredients for firms’ pricing strategies. Finally, the pricing
of gateway products under alternative competitive environments has broad implications for
public policies. Under counterfactual environments of high switching costs or a monopoly,
the optimal prices of low-end/gateway products are low. The aggressive pricing of low-end
products will drive the adoption of new technology goods by the population. More people,
especially relatively price-sensitive consumers, may actually benefit from this type of pricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section presents a
literature review. Section 2.2 describes the background of the industry and the data patterns
that motivate the subsequent modeling. In Section 2.3, I present the structural model of
dynamic demand for DSLR cameras. Section 2.4 discusses the methods of estimation and
identification. Section 2.5 presents demand estimation results and price elasticities. Section
3.1 introduces a simple supply-side model and studies pricing implications.
92.1.1 Literature Review
The demand model in this paper contributes to the literature on the dynamic demand
model of durable goods (e.g., Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012); Melnikov (2013); Goettler
and Gordon (2011)). In addition, Gordon (2009) studies how consumers make replacement
purchases when the current products they own are obsolete, using aggregate sales and product
ownership data in the PC processor industry. Sriram, Chintagunta, and Agarwal (2010)
studies dynamic purchasing behavior in related categories of technology durable goods.
Previous studies mostly use aggregate sales data and largely ignore consumer purchasing
pattern changes. Combining the micro moments from camera ownership transitions with
aggregate sales data, I am able to estimate a dynamic demand model for differentiated
products with mechanisms of consumer learning and switching costs across brands. In a
related paper, Huang (2015) offers an alternative story of learning by doing to explain
demand for compact or DSLR cameras; in his model, consumer accumulate product-specific
human capital by learning to use. In my model, consumers learn their general tastes for this
type of products; this learning is not brand-specific. The goal of this stylized learning model
is to describe consumers’ purchase behaviors and to remain simple enough to integrate with
the supply-side pricing model.
This paper also shares features with the literature on learning and switching cost
estimation. A growing literature utilizes panel data on consumer choices to study consumer
learning about cell-phone plan usage (e.g., Miravete and Palacios-Huerta (2014); Grubb
and Osborne (2015)). For consumer learning in my model, I assume consumers learn their
types immediately, as in Osborne (2011), rather than over time, as in a Bayesian updating
model such as in Erdem and Keane (1996); Ackerberg (2003); Crawford and Shum (2005);
Dickstein (2011). Switching costs have been estimated in various markets, such as the cable
industry (Shcherbakov (2009)), the health insurance market (Nosal (2012); Handel (2013)),
the detergent market (Osborne (2011)) and so on. In my case, the switching cost is the
10
cost of migrating to a different brand.7 The institutional settings in the DSLR camera
industry and panel data on consumer camera ownership history provide a good opportunity
for documenting the presence of structural state dependence, the switching cost. For DSLR
cameras, all accessories, especially the lenses, are compatible only to specific brands. Thus
I model the switching cost across brands to capture the cost of replacing everything that is
incompatible when consumers migrate to a new brand.
This paper also contributes to the literature on complementary choices (see Berry,
Khwaja, Kumar, et al. (2014) for a review on structural models of complementary choices).
Under the dynamic setting, substitutes in static environment can be complements (e.g., Lee,
Kumar, and Gupta (2013)). I show a previously unexamined role of vertically-differentiated
products in the dynamic setting: low-end DSLR cameras serve as gateway products that
most consumers purchase initially and learn about their own valuation/types; those high-
valuation consumers are likely upgrade to high-end DSLR cameras later. This paper
further models the supply pricing problem in a competitive environment given the demand
complementary relationship.
2.2 Industry and Preliminary Analysis of Data Patterns
2.2.1 The DSLR Camera Industry
Digital single-lens-reflex (DSLR) cameras are top-tier digital cameras, which deliver better
picture quality than compact cameras. A DSLR camera consists of a camera body and
has a lens that can be attached to its front. It has gained popularity since 2003, and has
become the major source of income for digital camera makers. Canon and Nikon are the
leading players in the market.
There is a cost of switching brands in the DSLR camera market. All accessories,
especially the lenses, are compatible only to specific brands. If a consumer switches to a new
brand for a replacement DSLR camera, she needs to replace everything that is incompatible.
7In my model, there is no extra cost switching to another product within the same brand.
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However, Canon and Nikon both chose to make all their DSLR cameras compatible with
all their lenses, so repeated purchasers can continue to use their old lenses with almost
all new DSLR camera bodies (across all product lines) purchased from the same brand.
The InfoTrends DSLR Survey shows that DSLR owners own 3.3 lenses on average and
take into account about the compatibility of old lenses when making DSLR camera choices
(see Chapter 6).8 In addition, the DSLR camera is like an experience good: a consumer
learns after purchase how often she uses the product and what features she prefers. Some
consumers may find themselves spending a lot of time using their DSLR cameras, and they
may be capable of using the advanced features in high-end cameras to shoot better pictures.
On the other hand, some consumers use thier DSLR cameras less frequently, and simple
low-end DSLR cameras are good enough for them.
Both Canon and Nikon offer a number of quality-differentiated products. Firms classify
their products into several product lines: (1) entry-level, (2) mid-level, (3) semi-professional-
level, and (4) professional-level.9 Different categories of product lines differ in their price
ranges. For example, an entry-level product costs less than $500 since 2008.10 Entry-level
cameras are aimed at new consumers that do not have previous experience using DSLR
cameras. However, it can take more than $4000 to buy a top professional-level DSLR
camera. Compared with entry-level product lines, the high-end cameras have the best
features: the highest number of pixels, the largest sensor size, the fastest shutter speed and
so on; these lines are aimed at consumers who are willing to pay for quality. In addition,
DSLR camera companies consistently refresh their existing products with new generations.
Within the same product line, different generations of products share similar technologies,
similar features and similar characteristics.11
8The survey was conducted by InfoTrends. This survey is administered in the U.S. via Web-based
questionnaire in September 2008. Among a total of 6,238 usable responses, 631 (10%) users owned a DSLR.
This survey has information on demographics, current DSLR and lens ownership and usage, as well as
repurchase intentions.
9Entry-level and mid-level DSLR cameras are low-end DSLR cameras; semi-professional-level and
professional-level DSLR cameras are high-end DSLR cameras. See a detailed list linking each DSLR camera
model to its product line category in Chapter 6.
10Firms in the DSLR camera market have a reputation for pricing at nearly cost for entry-level cameras.
11Note that different generations within the same product line follow a pattern in model names. For
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2.2.2 Data
In this section, I describe the source of my data and the summary statistics. I combine two
data sets. The first data set contains aggregate monthly sales and prices (1999-2006) for
the US DSLR camera market. However, from the aggregate sales data, repeated purchases
can not be distinguished from initial purchases, nor can individual purchase history be
observed. Thus, it is not sufficient for studying consumer learning and switching dynamics.
So I collected a second data set of individual-level panel data of DSLR camera ownership
from Flickr (2001-2013). The Flickr panel data provide a valuable opportunity for me to
track consumers’ repeated purchase behaviors of a durable good.
The first aggregate data set comes from the NPD Tchworld group. This data set
provides information on the prices and quantities of all DSLR camera models in the US
DSLR camera market from December 1999 to November 2006.12 Each observation is a
month-model combination. Each camera model was sold in several versions: the DSLR
body alone, or a “kit” version that combined the body with one lens. I aggregate the
sales of the kit versions into a single model since I study the purchase behavior of the
DSLR camera body only. I create market shares by dividing sales by the number of US
households owning digital cameras in 2000. The prices are calculated as the average prices
across different versions. There are five companies in the industry. Nikon and Canon are
the leading players in the market in terms of sales and number of products offered (see
Table 6.1). I link this data set to product characteristics, which are publicly available from
the Dpreview website as a complementary data set.13 For each DSLR model, I collect
information about characteristics: resolution, sensor size, size of LCD display, maximum
shutter speed, etc. These characteristics include most of what consumers care about when
instance, Canon named its entry-level products of different generations as ”EOS-300D”, ”EOS-400D” and
”EOS-500D”. Marketing plays a role in naming: similar name with different numbers invites consumers to
group cameras and expect only incremental difference between products within the same line.
12The Retail channels include eCommerce and catalog, but exclude WalMart, Drug and Wholesale Club.
This dataset starts from the beginning of the DSLR camera industry.
13http://www.dpreview.com/
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making the repurchase decisions as shown in the survey.14 Table 6.2 presents summary
statistics on characteristics.
In addition to the aggregate monthly sales data, I collected a unique individual-level
panel dataset of DSLR camera ownership from Flickr in 2013. Flickr is one of the most
popular online image-hosting websites; on it, users share personal photos. For each photo,
the camera type and the time when the photo was taken (not only the time it was uploaded)
are publicly available. We can track the photos of each Flickr user over time. I restrict users
to those who uploaded at least one picture taken by a DSLR camera before January 1, 2012.
For each identified user, I collect all the photo information from their photo history. The
raw data set contains a total of 4,839 users and information from their 6 million (6,213,923)
photos.15 I observe camera model and brand, whether the camera is a DSLR camera or not,
and date when the picture was taken. I do not observe actual purchase decisions from this
dataset, nor can I observe the prices consumers pay for their cameras. Thus, I only extract
information on patterns of consumers’ camera ownership transitions from Flickr data. 16
To recover information about the ownership of cameras over time from the picture
observations, I apply three restrictions to define what it means for a user to own a DSLR
camera model. First, the total number of pictures taken by a DSLR camera has to be larger
than 10. I set this lower boundary to avoid cases where users may have uploaded 1 or 2
pictures taken with friends’ cameras. The second restriction is that there have to be more
than 5 pictures in a row taken with the DSLR camera model.17 Finally, I require users
14In the InfoTrends DSLR survey, interviewers asked consumers to pick the most important reasons for
purchasing a replacement DSLR camera. The top 5 reasons are:(1) higher resolution; (2)larger sensor;(3)new
features; (4) larger LCD screen; (5) faster response time/more frames per second.
15See Chapter 6 for details of the data collection and cleaning.
16Another limitation of my data is that the sample of DSLR users on Flickr is selective. It includes
international users (mostly from developed countries). I cannot identify the demographic information, so
I cannot restrict it to just U.S users. Thus, the DSLR usage pattern may not be representative of U.S
DSLR users. To use the Flickr data of DSLR usage in combination with U.S aggregate sales data, I have to
assume that people share similar DSLR usage patterns across the world. This assumption is supported by
the fact that the ownership length and purchase frequencies estimated from Flickr data are actually quite
comparable to the U.S DSLR 2008 survey data.
17 This restriction is because some Flickr accounts are public accounts on which different users upload
pictures in response to a particular theme. In such cases, a number of pictures could have been taken with
the same camera model but by different people at different times. If that happens, there are gaps between
the photo observations from the same camera model.
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to have used the DSLR camera model more than one month. This one-month restriction
is defined by the time gap between the oldest and newest picture taken with this camera
model. Applying these restrictions, for each user, I was able to get a sequence of DSLR
camera ownership. Each ownership’s starting date is defined as the date of the first picture
taken with the particular camera. The time span can be quite long: the earliest DSLR
ownership dates to December 2001. Some of the DSLR ownership history goes back more
than 10 years. I further removed users that owned more than 10 DSLR cameras. These
initial filters lead to a dataset of 2718 users that own a total of 4978 DSLR camera models.
Table 6.3 shows descriptive statistics of the DSLR camera ownership data. On average,
everyone owned slightly fewer than 2 cameras. Half of users (53.5%) owned only one DSLR
camera, never repurchasing in the data sample; the other half ( 46.5%) purchased 2 or more
cameras (see Table 6.3). The average holding time for the consumers who repurchased more
than one DSLR cameras before a replacement purchase was about 19.2 months, which is
comparable to the 22 months from InfoTrends DSLR survey data.18
To form a sample for estimation, I combine the two data sets and restrict attention to
DSLR cameras from Nikon and Canon, which constitute 89.8% of total DSLR camera sales
in aggregate data. I restrict the camera models to those periods when (1) both low-end
and high-end products were offered by Canon and Nikon and (2) the camera models were
observable from both the aggregate and the Flickr data. In the sample of the aggregate
sales data, I further exclude from the choice set the camera models that sold fewer than
50 units in one month. In the final sample of the Flickr data, 26.64% of all users (852)
purchased 2 or more cameras; the remaining 73.36% owned only one DSLR camera and
never repurchased. Among the users who repurchased: 68.47% of the time, previous Canon
users chose Canon when repurchasing; 62.92% of the time, previous Nikon users chose Nikon
when repurchasing. In addition, when repurchasing, low-end camera owners will “upgrade”
to high-end cameras 23.03% of the time. This frequency is higher than the frequency that
18Interviews for InfoTrends Survey ask the following question to their respondents:”How long did you own
your old Digital SLR camera before buying a replacement or additional DSLR camera?”
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consumers chose high-end cameras initially (10.8%). A more detailed description of the
cleaning and creation of the sample data set appears in the appendix 6.
2.2.3 Preliminary Analysis of Purchasing Patterns
In this subsection, I summarize consumer purchasing patterns I observed from Flickr DSLR
camera ownership data. The data show the evidence of consumer learning as well as the
existence of switching cost across brands. These observable patterns motivate the modeling
specifications in the following sections.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of the camera ownership data recovered from photo
observations. The line in the 3-D space is the evolution of an individual’s ownership history
over time. Each “X” in the line indicates the starting point of a new ownership. Each
ownership includes information about the DSLR camera model as well as the starting date.
For example, we see that the person begins with a entry-level Canon DSLR model “400D”,
then repurchases another entry-level Canon DSLR model “450D” 2 years later. 19 After
another one year, she upgrades to a semi-professional-level Canon DSLR model “5DMarkII”.
Figure 2.1: An Example of Flickr Data
2003 2005
2007 2009
2011 2013
Canon
Nikon
Entry
Mid
Semi−Pro
Pro
5D Mark II
450D
400D
19Note that in Flickr data, we do not observe any actual purchase time. We can only ”approximate” the
starting date of ownership as the date of first observed picture taken by this particular DSLR.
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2.2.4 Low-end DSLR Cameras as Gateway Products
The changes in purchasing pattern suggest that low-end DSLR cameras are gateway products
that most consumers buy initially. Among first-time users, low-end camera users who will
repurchase use their cameras more often than those who will not repurchase. In addition,
consumers who repurchase are more likely to buy high-end DSLR cameras.
Specifically, the graph on the top in Figure 2.2 shows a histogram of line and brand
distribution for all first-purchased DSLR cameras, and the graph on the bottom shows
a histogram for all repurchased DSLR cameras. There are two noteworthy points. First,
low-end cameras, especially the entry-level DSLR cameras, are most popular among first-
time buyers.20 These low-end cameras are relatively cheap. However, among people who
choose to repurchase, less of them would choose entry-level cameras. Second, few people
would go for high-end DSLR cameras like Semi-professional- or Professional-level cameras
initially. In contrast, when consumers repurchase, many people bought semi-professional-
or professional-level cameras. These purchase pattern changes must be due to consumer
learning or taste changes.
In addition, there is evidence of learning: (i) the initial purchasing patterns of first-time
buyers who will repurchase are similar to those who never repurchase (see Figure 6.1);
and (ii) most consumers (low-end DSLR camera users) who choose to repurchase use their
cameras more often and tend to upgrade. To substantiate this claim, I make the following
calculations. For all first-purchased cameras, I compute the average number of photos users
posted in one year, which also approximates consumers’ “enthusiasm”. Table 6.4 shows
the means and percentiles of the distribution of usage intensity, separately by product-
lines of first-purchased cameras. I find that low-end camera users who repurchased used
their cameras more often. These consumers also tend to upgrade their cameras when
20Nikon is different from the others as the sales of mid-level product lines is higher than the sales of
entry-level product lines for first-time buyers. This is because Nikon introduced its first entry-level DSLR
”D50” relatively late in June 2005 (While Canon introduced the first entry-line DSLR ”EOS300D” in 2003).
Thus for a long time (from 2003 till 2005), the bottom line of Nikon was its mid-level model; it had no
entry-level models.
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repurchasing. 21 I conclude that consumers learn their ex-post usage/valuation through
purchase; consumers can repurchase and possibly change product-lines in response to
learning.
Figure 2.2: Product-Line choices: First-time Buyers vs. Repeated Buyers
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21Interestingly, for the relatively few high-end camera users, some consumers who repurchased used their
cameras less often than those who never repurchased. Also note that when repurchasing, about 50% of the
time these high-end camera users would choose low-end cameras instead. See Table 6.5 for detailed transition
probabilities of product lines for repurchased DSLR cameras. This pattern could provide additional evidence
of learning.
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2.2.5 Brand Switching
Data show that when repurchasing, consumers are likely to remain with their previous
choice of brands. In Table 2.1, which shows the transition probabilities of brand ownership,
I pooled all users that had multiple DSLR cameras. We see from the table that especially for
Canon and Nikon users, about 71%-75% of the time consumers stayed with their previous
brand choice. For Sony and Olympus users, about 60%-68% of the time consumers stayed
with their previous brand. This high probability of staying with the previous choice of brand
suggests there is a substantial switching cost migrating to another brand. This switching
cost reflects the effects from the incompatibility of lenses across different brands.
Table 2.1: Brand Transition Among Repurchasers
Canon Nikon Sony Olympus Pentax
Canon 71.4% 20.3% 2.2% 4.5% 1.6%
Nikon 17.7% 74.8% 1.6% 4.8% 1%
Sony 16% 13.8% 67.6% 0.8% 1.7%
Olympus 21.4% 16.7% 0.8% 59.3% 1.7%
Pentax 26.4% 26.4% 5.6% 13.2% 28.3%
1 # transition obs count: Canon(689); Nikon(683); Sony(238);
Olympus(597); Pentax(53).
In addition, data show that the number of Canon and Nikon users is larger than that
of their rivals. In the full data sample, 54% of all users chose Canon or Nikon DSLR as
their first cameras. When repurchasing, around 91%− 93% of time the previous Canon and
Nikon users stayed with either Canon and Nikon. In addition, around 30%− 38% of the
time the previous Sony and Olympus users moved to either Canon or Nikon, and around
52.8% of the time the previous Pentax users switched to either Canon or Nikon.22
22 As to brand loyalty, among the 1264 users that owned multiple DSLR cameras,23752 (59.5%) users
are loyal to one brand. The remaining 512 (40.5%) users switched brand at least once during their DSLR
ownership history.
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2.2.6 Using One DSLR Camera at A Time
The data show that people use their most recently purchased cameras most of the time.
To show this point, I make the following calculations. For users that own multiple DSLR
cameras, I define a proportion of camera usage for each ownership interval starting from
the second (e.g one person owns a latest DSLR camera model “C” from 2006 - 2008). I
define the proportion of photos taken with the newly purchased camera as: the number of
pictures taken using the most recently purchased camera divided by the total number of
pictures taken by all cameras owned by one person to date. Figure 6.2 shows the empirical
complementary CDF distribution of the proportion. For 70% of the ownership intervals
people use their most recently purchased DSLR camera most of the time, which is defined
as 80% of the time. In addition, for 44% of the ownership intervals people use their most
recently purchased DSLR camera all the time, when the proportion equals to exactly 1.
Thus, I conclude people use one DSLR camera at a time and each repurchase can be seen
as a replacement purchase.
In summary, the individual-level Flickr data show the importance of modeling the
switching cost across brand and learning dynamics in consumer choices. Consumers
typically start with low-end cameras. After purchase, consumers learn about their own
usage and valuation of the products. Those consumers who repurchase tend to use their
cameras more often. They are also more likely to upgrade to high-end cameras, often from
the same brand as the initial purchases.
2.3 Structural Model
The structural model is designed to include consumer learning and the switching cost into
a dynamic demand framework for a durable product. The design of the model needs not
only to capture the rich patterns observed in the Flickr data, but also to remain sufficiently
simple to be computable. Thus, I impose several assumptions in specifying the learning and
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switching process of consumers. First I assume that a consumer who has never purchased a
DSLR camera before does not know in advance her subjective valuation of using a DSLR
camera, especially the advanced cameras. I further assume that a consumer can learn
her valuation of DSLR cameras by purchasing and starting to use one.24 In the learning
process, she may find herself “enthusiastic” about photography, and she may be capable of
utilizing the features of high-end cameras to shoot better pictures. I name this category
of consumers the “enthusiastic” type. On the other hand, a consumer may find a simple
low-end DSLR camera is good enough for her to shoot reasonably good pictures – this
category of consumers is called the “neutral” type. Consumers’ learning of their types causes
them to behave differently when considering to repurchase DSLR cameras. In addition to
the learning process, I include the switching cost across brands explicitly: a consumer pays
costs if she switches to a new brand when repurchasing. The switching cost is meant to
represent the cost of replacing lenses or accessories that are incompatible with the new
brand.25 In my structural model, the consumers’ purchase and repurchase decisions are
dynamically determined by the learning process and the switching cost, together with the
characteristics and prices of DSLR cameras.
I focus on the two leading companies in the industry (Canon and Nikon), and I associate
each DSLR camera model with one of the two product-line groups (low-end and high-end
camera models).26 Specifically, the timing of the dynamic decision process is as follows.
Each period is one month. In each period, every consumer makes a dynamic choice of
whether to buy a DSLR camera. I first assume that a consumer owns at most one DSLR
camera at a time, which means that each new camera purchase is a replacement purchase
and the consumer discards her old camera at no cost.27 At the beginning of the time period,
24I assume learning is independent of DSLR camera model choices. Thus, there is no value of experimen-
tation with alternative camera models.
25However, I do not directly model the decisions consumers make to purchase lenses because I do not
have data on lens sales.
26In principle, a more detailed categorization of product lines can be included in the model in a straight-
forward way, but it brings a significant increase in the computational burden.
27I am assuming that consumers are not using multiple cameras at the same time. This assumption can be
justified, as in figure 6.2 most users use the most recently purchased camera most of the time. In addition, I
assume there is no resale value for old DSLR cameras on the secondary market.
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a consumer is set to hold the outside good, and she does not know her type – “enthusiastic”
or “neutral”. Thus the consumer has to calculate her ex-ante expected utility with respect
to her type distribution when buying her first camera model. Once the consumer buys
her first camera, the consumer learns her type immediately, and the inventory is updated.
Knowledge of her type will start to affect her repurchase choices starting from the next
period. In addition, I associate a switching cost with the choice of migrating to a new brand
when repurchasing cameras.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of the Dynamic Discrete Choice
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2.3.1 Utility
In formalizing the payoffs, at each period t, I index all camera models by j = 1, 2, .., Jt.
Each camera model (i.e., model j) belongs to a product-line group g(j) ∈ {l, h} and brand
b(j) ∈ {C,N}. When defining the utility in one time period, I distinguish the purchase
stage from the consumption stage. I will start by defining flow utility in the purchase stage.
At period t, if a consumer i buys a model j that belongs to product group g(j) and brand
b(j) , she gets utility uijt at the time of purchase:
uijt = fijt − φbb01{b(j)6=b0it} + ijt = xjtα
x + ξjt − αpi pjt − φbb
0
1{b(j)6=b0it} + ijt, (1)
22
where fijt is the utility associated with camera j from brand b(j), which is a function
of observable characteristics xjt, unobservable characteristics ξjt, price pjt, as well as
individual persistently heterogeneous preferences for characteristics αx and price αpi . 1{.}
is an indicator function. Let Zit ≡ (b0it g0it) denote the current inventory that includes the
brand, b0it ∈ {∅, C,N}, and the product-line group, g0it ∈ {∅, l, h}. The switching cost, φbb
0
,
can be brand-dependent, which a consumer must pay if she switches from brand b0it of the
current inventory to a new brand b(j).28 Finally, ijt is the shock to utility when consumer
i purchases camera j at time t.
At the consumption stage, if the consumer does not purchase any product (j = 0) at
period t, the consumer gets utility ui0t from using the camera in her inventory:
ui0t = fi0t + iot = γl1{g0it=l} + λiγh1{g0it=h} + i0t, (2)
where g0it is the product-line group of the consumer’s current camera, γl and γh are average
flow utilities of usage (γh > γl > 0), derived from consumers’ usage of low-end camera
models and high-end camera models, respectively. In this model, a consumer’s utility of
using camera in inventory depends on two factors: 1) the product-line group of the camera,
and 2) the consumer’s type (“enthusiastic” or “neutral”). This setup implies that the
consumer enjoys the level of the DSLR camera she owns, without distinguishing among
specific camera models within the same product-line group.29 In addition, λi takes either
28Note that I assume switching cost only happens if a consumer switches brand when she repurchases.
That is to say, a consumer does not pay a switching cost when making her first purchase. Thus, strictly
speaking, the switching cost happens when b(j) 6= b0it and b0it 6= ∅.
29This assumption is similar in spirit to that in Hendel and Nevo (2006). They allow benefits relating
to product characteristics to come only at the time of purchase, not at the moment of consumption. In
the consumption stage of their model, the consumer only tracks the amount of detergent remaining; in the
consumption stage of my model, the consumer just tracks a scalar utility that depends on the product-line
group. However, I do not model the depreciation of the camera that costumer owns, which can be modeled
at a cost of increasing the state space.
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takes a low value , λN (normalized to 1) with probability PN , when a consumer is the
“neutral” type, or takes a high value, λE(λE ≥ λN > 0) with probability PE , when a
consumer is the “enthusiastic” type.30 λi measures how much a consumer values advanced
features of high-end cameras, which she learns immediately after purchase. Finally, iot is
the shock to utility. I make the following assumptions about the distributions of −→ .
Assumption 1 −→ijt are extreme value type 1 random variables that are independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time, products and individuals.
2.3.2 The Consumer’s Dynamic Optimization Problem
The consumer has a dynamic decision-making problem. In the dynamics, the consumer
learns about her type after purchase, incurs costs when switching to other brands, and
chooses the timing of (re)purchase.
For each consumer i at time t, I denote state variables as Sit, which contain all of the
relevant information for decisions. Specifically, Sit = {Zit, λi,−→ijt,Ωit}, where (1) Zit is the
inventory state variable, which includes the brand and product-line group of the camera
under the current ownership; (2) λi is the individual type parameter relating to the type of
consumers, which requires learning; (3) −→ijt are the i.i.d. shocks consumers experience when
making decisions. (4) Ωit denotes the industry state at time t, which can include every
camera model’s characteristics and prices. Ωit follows a Markov process. The dynamic
optimization problem can be described by the following Bellman equations.
At the state of empty inventory, consumer i is uncertain about her type, λi, and needs to
form ex-ante expectations about her possible types when making decisions. The consumer
maximizes utility either by consuming the outside good, or buying a DSLR camera on the
market, learning her type and returning next period with a new inventory type. I can write
consumer i’s problem at Zit = (∅∅) using the Bellman equation 31 :
30I let the data tell whether enthusiastic consumers are different from neutral consumers.
31I can also write the Vi(∅∅, it,Ωit) as Vi (∅∅,λi,ijt,Ωit). By definition I have Vi(∅∅,E,ijt,Ωit) =
Vi(∅∅,N ,ijt,Ωit).
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Vi(∅∅, it,Ωit) = max{iot + βE[Vi(∅∅, it+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]︸ ︷︷ ︸,
Consume outside good, return with the empty inventory
max
j∈Jt
{uijt + β
∑
λi
E[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]P λi}︸ ︷︷ ︸},
Buy a DSLR camera today, return next period with new inventory
(3)
where PE is the probability a consumer is the “enthusiastic” type , and PN = 1− PE is
the probability a consumer is the “neutral” type. At this stage of the model, consumers are
homogeneous in their expectations over their possible types; they are only heterogeneous
in their preferences for prices. After consumers make the first purchase and find their
valuations of advanced features, they will behave differently when considering to repurchase
DSLR cameras.
Thus similarly, at inventory state Zit = (g
0
it b
0
it) 6= (∅∅), consumer i maximizes utility
either by using the current camera in inventory, or buying a DSLR camera on the market
and possibly returning next period with a new inventory type. The Bellman equation
becomes:
Vi(g0b0, λi, it,Ωit) = max{uiot + βE[Vi(g0b0, λi, it+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]︸ ︷︷ ︸,
Consumer current inventory, return with same inventory
max
j∈Jt
{uijt + βE[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]}︸ ︷︷ ︸}.
Buy a DSLR camera today, return next period possibly with new inventory
(4)
We have already defined the consumer’s problem. The following subsections illustrate
simplifications to make the model tractable.
25
2.3.3 Simplifications and Additional Assumptions
I start with a general overview of the problems in computation, and then discuss more
technical details in later subsections.
The first problem is the dimensionality of the state space. The state space includes not
only the individual-specific types, inventory types and shocks, but also all the characteristics
and prices of camera models in all brands and product-line groups. Taking into account
of the transition probabilities of states as well, the dimensionality makes the problem
computationally infeasible. To reduce state space, consumers are presumed to perceive
sufficient statistics to form expectations for the evolution of the utilities of purchasing. In
addition, when the market exhibits switching costs across brands, the lifetime utility of
purchasing a product (i.e., the choice-specific value function) is no longer independent of
the consumer inventory type. Thus, consumers have to track a relatively large number of
choice-specific value functions for every combination of choice of group and inventory type.
To deal with this problem, I implement a simplified relationship between choice-specific
value functions at different inventory state, separating the role inventory type played by
using a constant switching cost in affecting inclusive values. As a result, it is sufficient to
track less choice-specific value functions.
2.3.3.1 Inclusive Values
In order to reduce the state space, consumers are presumed to perceive “inclusive flow
values” to form expectations for the evolution of the utilities of purchasing. These “inclusive
flow values” are defined by prices and characteristics of a category of products, which are
exogenous.32 Generally, the inclusive flow value δfigbt associated with product line group g
32Papers in the literature also make use of the logit inclusive value as sufficient statistics. The logit
inclusive value, applying properties of Assumption 1, can characterize the maximum expected lifetime
utility of purchasing within a group of products, without conditioning on which specific product is being
purchased. However, using logit inclusive value that contains continuation value causes the endogeneity
problem summarized in Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) and discussed in detail in Gowrisankaran and
Rysman (2014). As these authors point out, the logit inclusive value, which incorporates the continuation
value, contains agents’ endogenous behaviors as well. In my model, I avoid this problem by dividing the
products into four categories (two brands and two product-line groups) in advance and assuming products
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and brand b at time t is defined as:
δfigbt = δ
f
igbt(Ωit) = log(
∑
j∈Jgbt
exp{fijt}) g ∈ {l, h}, b ∈ {C,N}. (5)
Assumption 2 (Inclusive Value Sufficiency): I assume the inclusive flow values and the
transition probability for inclusive values are sufficient statistics for consumers to make
dynamic decisions. That is: F ({δfigbt}|Ωit−1) = F ({δfigbt}|{δfigbt−1}). In addition, consumers
perceive the evolution of {δfigbt} can be summarized by a first-order Markov process:
δfigbt+1 = h
0
igb + h
1
igbδ
f
igbt + vigbt ∀gb ∈ {lC, hC, lN, hN}, (6)
where vigbt are normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σigb.
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Because of Assumption 2, the consumer is restricted to track four inclusive flow values,
{δfigbt} ≡ {δfilCt, δfihCt, δfilNt, δfihNt}, to form her expectation, instead of tracking all the
DSLR characteristics in Ωit and forming a multidimensional expectation. As a result, the
number of stochastically evolving states have been reduced dramatically from |Ωit| to a
tractable 4-dimensional space.34 In addition, following the literature (see Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2012); Lee (2013)), I make functional form assumptions about consumer
beliefs. A simplest assumption is to specify consumer expectation as perfect foresight (see
Conlon (2012)). Under such an assumption, a consumer knows the future {δfigbt} and there
is a one-to-one mapping from time t to δf . I believe it is more realistic to assume that
the consumer has limited ability to predict the future; in my case, the consumer uses a
within the same category deliver the same flow utility of usage. As a result, I am able to use the inclusive
flow value instead. This difference matters when I restrict consumer expectations according to the evolution
of their inclusive (flow) values.
33Variance of vigbt and parameters {hjigb}j,gb are estimated using the ordinary least squares.
34Also because the marginal utility from price is specific to the individual, the inclusive flow value and
the future distribution F ({δfigbt}|{δfigbt−1}) will also be specific to the individual.
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AR(1) process to predict future utility.35 However, the functional form assumption can be
controversial since it may not be consistent with the supply model.
2.3.3.2 Switching Cost and Choice-specific Value Functions
The consumer’s dynamic decision problem is complicated by the existence of switching
costs. When there are switching costs across brands, the value of purchasing is affected by
the consumers’ inventory. For instance, all other things being equal, Canon camera users
will find new DSLR cameras from Canon more valuable and attractive than similar new
cameras from Nikon. This is because consumers can save the switching cost if they buy
from the same brand. As a result, the choice-specific value functions are functions of both
the choice of camera model and the brand type in inventory.
I define CV jb
0
i (Sit) as consumer i’s choice-specific value function specific to purchasing
model j from brand b(j) given previous brand b0 (consider non-empty inventory first, i.e.
b0 6= ∅): it’s the value obtained by purchasing a camera model j from brand b(j) ∈ {C,N}
given current inventory from brand b0it ∈ {C,N}, not including current idiosyncratic shocks.
Specifically,
CV jb
0
i (Sit) = fijt − φbb
0
1{b(j) 6=b0} + βE[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit] ∀b, b0 ∈ {C,N}.
Similarly, I define CV j∅i (Sit) as consumer i’s choice-specific value function specific to
purchasing model j from brand b(j) given empty inventory, b0it = ∅, not including current
idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, there is no switching cost associated with making the
first purchase. Specifically,
CV j∅i (Sit) = fijt + β
∑
λi
E[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]P λi ∀b ∈ {C,N}.
First, I assume the switching cost is a constant, φ, that does not depend on brands. In
35In the earlier version of this paper, I also used an alternative set up as: δfigbt+1 = h
0
igb + h
1
igbδ
f
ilCt +
h2igbδ
f
ihCt + h
3
igbδ
f
ilNt + h
4
igbδ
f
ihNt + vigbt ∀gb ∈ {lC, hC, lN, hN}. I do not find the results change much.
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addition, fixing consumer type i and λi, a consumer who chooses Canon today and was not
using Canon previously would face the same set of options and utility levels in the future
as a consumer who continuously use a Canon camera (see Shcherbakov (2009)). Therefore,
CV jb
0
i −φ = CV jb
′
i ;∀b
′ 6= b0 = b(j). This relationship between choice-specific value functions
given different inventory types makes it possible for me to consider only a limited number
of choice-specific value functions: CV jb
0
i and CV
j∅
i , where b(j) = b
0, ∀b0 ∈ {C,N}. This
is to say, I can separate the value of purchase and the cost of switching brands through
inventory update.
To link the choice-specific value functions to the maximum value of purchasing from a
particular brand b ∈ {C,N} and product-line group g ∈ {l, h} at time t given inventory
brand b0it, δigbt(Ωit, b
0
it), I use the property of Assumption 1 to aggregate the choice-specific
value functions within the same brand and product-line group.36 We have the following
relationships:
δigbt(Ωit, ∅, λi) = log(
∑
j∈Jgbt exp{CV j∅})
= δfigbt + β
∑
λE[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit]P λ;
δigbt(Ωit, b, λi) = log(
∑
j∈Jgbt exp{CV jb})
= δfigbt + βE[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit];
δigbt(Ωit, b
′
, λi) = log(
∑
j∈Jgbt exp{CV jb
′})
= δfigbt − φ+ βE[Vi(g(j)b(j), λi, ijt+1,Ωit+1)|Ωit] = δigbt(Ωit, b, λi)− φ.
∀b′ 6= b
2.3.4 The Simplified Dynamic Problem
The preceding model and assumptions allow me to decompose consumer choice into two
separate components: 1) a static problem of choosing a specific camera model within a
36For simplicity, I ignore Euler constant term in calculating logit inclusive value.
29
brand and product-line group; 2) a dynamic problem of choosing brands and product-line
groups.
2.3.4.1 The “Static” Choice Within A Product Category
The probability that a consumer will buy DSLR camera model j that belongs to brand
b(j) = b and product-line group g(j) = g can be written as:37
Pr(j, gb|Z, λ, {δfgb}) = Pr(j|gb, Z, λ, {δfgb})× Pr(gb|Z, λ, {δfgb}).
Assumption 1 implies that, after appropriate cancellations, we have:
Pr(j|gb, Z, λ, {δfgb}) =
exp(fj)∑
k∈Jgb exp(fk)
=
exp(fj)
exp(δfgb)
.
Thus, the decision of which particular camera model a consumer will buy within a brand/-
product-line group is a static problem. The remaining problem involves the consumer’s
dynamic choice of brands and product-line group, which can be rewritten in terms of
inclusive flow values as state variables, as the next subsection shows.
2.3.4.2 The Dynamic Choice of Product Category
In the simplified dynamic problem, the consumer chooses whether and what brand/product-
line group to purchase. Her flow utility of purchasing a new camera from brand b and
product-line group g is δfigbt + igbt. The inclusive flow value δ
f
igbt is the expected flow utility
that results from buying the best camera that belongs to brand b and product-line group g,
before observing the realizations of jgbt. In addition, the consumer tracks only a summary
of the industry state space, namely the four flow inclusive values, to make purchase decisions.
Finally, I use the expected value function that has integrated over the realization of −→ijt
defined as (Rust, 1987): EVi(Sit) =
∫
 Vi(Sit)g(
−→ )d−→ . Applying the logit aggregation over
37The type subscript i and time subscript t are dropped for notational simplicity.
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all the choices for each inventory state, I can rewrite the simplified dynamic programing
problem as a joint contraction mapping:38
EV (∅∅, {δfgb}) = log(
∑
gB exp(δ
f
gB + β
∑
λE[EV (gB, λ, {δ
′f
gb}){δfgb}]P λ)
+ exp(βE[EV (∅∅, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}])), (7)
EV (gB, λ, {δfgb}) = log(
∑
g exp(δ
f
gB + βE[EV (lB, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}])
+
∑
g′ exp(δ
f
g′B′
− φ+ βE[EV (g′B′ , λ, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}])
+ exp(λγg + βE[EV (gB, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]))
∀g ∈ {l, h},∀B ∈ {C,N}, B′ 6= B, λ ∈ {λE , λN}. (8)
With the Inclusive Value Sufficiency assumption, the optimal consumer behavior re-
garding brand and product-line groups choice is determined by the joint solution to the
inclusive flow value defined in (5), the consumer’s industry evolution perception defined in
(6), and the expected value function equations in (7)− (8).
2.3.5 Choice Probabilities
2.3.5.1 Choice of Brands and Product-line Groups
When calculating choice probabilities, one has to distinguish whether or not the consumers
have already learned their types. After making the first purchase, consumers find their
types, and the realized types will affect consumers’ repurchasing decisions.39
38I ignore Euler constant term.
39This learning process is the key to model the line-upgrade behaviors among repurchases, which I have
observed in the Flickr data. Without learning, consumers’ persistent preference types ({αx, αPi }) alone
would predict consumers behavior in a consistent manner over time. For instance, if a consumer cares about
portability and price, she will prefer to substitute a new camera that is also small and cheap for her current
camera when repurchasing. However, this consistent behavior contradicts what I have observed in the Flickr
data: consumers mostly start with low-end cameras that are relatively cheap and small; when repurchasing,
many of them will purchase high-end cameras that are relatively expensive and large.
31
I begin with calculating the choice probabilities for consumers who haven’t learned their
types — those who are currently in the empty inventory state. Given the i.i.d extreme
value distribution of the error term, the probabilities that a consumer will buy one product
from brand b˜ ∈ {C,N} and product-line group g˜ ∈ {l, h} can be expressed in the following
way:
Pr(g˜b|∅∅, λ, {δfgb}) = exp(E(∅∅,λ))exp(E(∅∅,λ))+exp(O(∅∅,λ)) ×
exp(δg˜b(∅∅,λ))
exp(E(∅∅,λ)) ,
where E(∅∅, λ) = log(∑gb∈{lC,hC,lN,hN} exp(δfgb+β∑λE[EV (gb, λ, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}]P λ)) is the
value of making a purchase on the market given the empty inventory state; O(∅∅, λ) =
βE[EV (∅∅, λ, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}] is the outside value of not making any purchase and remaining
at the empty inventory state; δg˜b(∅∅, λ) = δfg˜b + β
∑
λE[EV (g˜b, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]P λ is the
value of purchasing the best camera from brand b˜ and product-line group g˜ from the current
empty inventory state. Thus, the first part in the expression of probability product is the
probability of entering the market at this time, and the second part is the conditional
probability of making a purchase from brand b˜ and product-line group g˜ given that the
consumer enters the market.
Intuitively, a consumer is motivated to choose a low-end cameras as the first camera if
the choice-specific value associated with low-end cameras is higher than that of high-end
cameras. To show this, taking the difference of the two inclusive values of purchasing from
low-end Canon or high-end Canon, the difference equals :
(δflC − δflC)+
β[
∑
λE[EV (lC, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]P λ −
∑
λE[EV (hC, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]P λ].
A consumer would choose a low-end Canon camera rather than a high-end Canon camera
initially for two reasons: (1) The flow utility associated with lC ,δflC , is larger than the flow
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utility associated with hC, δfhC . This difference could be due to the low price of low-end
camera models, or could be due to the presence of some desirable features of low-end
camera models. (2) The ex-ante expected option value associated with the high-end camera
is not high enough. A consumer may only value a high-end DSLR camera if she is the
enthusiastic type. However, the ex-ante probability of her being an enthusiastic type can
be relatively low, so that
∑
λE[EV (hC, λ, .)|.]P λ is not high enough to motivate her to
purchase a high-end camera model initially.
Next I will show the choice probabilities for consumers who have already learned their
types — those who are currently in non-empty inventory states. Similarly, the probabilities
that a consumer at inventory state lb0 will buy one product from brand b˜ ∈ {C,N} and
product-line group g˜ ∈ {l, h} can be expressed in the following way:
Pr(g˜b|lb0, λ, {δfgb}) = exp(E(Z=lb
0,λ))
exp(E(lb0,λ))+exp(O(lb0,λ))
× exp(δg˜b(lb
0,λ))
exp(E(lb0,λ))
,
where E(lb0, λ) = log(
∑
gb∈{lC,hC,lN,hN} exp(δ
f
gb − φ1{b6=b0} + βE[EV (gb, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]))
is the value of making a purchase on the market given current inventory state Z =
lb0; O(lb0, λ) = γl + βE[EV (lb0, λ, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}] is the outside value of not making any
purchase and remaining at the current inventory state; δg˜b(lb
0, λ) = δf
g˜b
− φ1{b 6=b0} +
βE[EV (g˜b, λ, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}] is the value of purchasing from brand b˜ and product-line group
g˜ from the current inventory state Z = lb0.
The option value associated with the product plays a crucial rule in affecting consumers’
choice of product-line groups when repurchasing. Intuitively, the model will predict that
some consumers who have learned they are enthusiastic types are likely to upgrade to
high-end cameras when the option value of high-end cameras for enthusiastic type is high
enough. On the contrary, if a consumer has learned that she is the neutral type, she may be
unlikely to purchase a high-end camera, even she can afford one. This is because she knows
for sure she would not enjoy a high-end camera enough to compensate for its high price.
In addition, the switching cost brings inflexibility in consumers’ choices of brands when
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repurchasing. The higher the cost of switching brand, the smaller number of consumer will
purchase a different brand when repurchasing. Finally, improvements in characteristics and
qualities or price drops also give consumers incentives to repurchase.
For instance, consider a consumer who has already learned she is an enthusiastic type,
and she currently owns a low-end Canon camera. Comparing inclusive value function of
high-end Canon camera with that of the low-end Nikon camera, the difference equals:
(δfhC − δflN ) + φ+
β[E[EV (hC,E, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}]− E[EV (lN,E, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}]].
A consumer would be motivated to choose a high-end Canon rather than a low-end Nikon
camera when repurchasing for three reasons: (1)The flow utility associated with hC ,δfhC is
larger than the flow utility associated with lN , δflN . This difference could be due to price
drop of high-end Canon cameras, or could be due to an improvement of desirable features
of high-end Canon cameras. (2) The cost of switching brand (φ) is high. (3)The expected
option value associated with the high-end camera is high. Because the consumer has learned
that she is the enthusiastic type, I have [EV (hC,E, {δ′fgb})|{δfgb}] > [EV (lN,E, {δ
′f
gb})|{δfgb}].
2.3.5.2 Market Shares of Camera Models
The choice probabilities for a particular product j that belongs to brand b and product-line
group depends on consumer types i and λi as well as inventory type Z. Thus, to compute
the market shares for a particular camera model j at time t, one has to track the inventory
distribution for each consumer i and λi, and then add these market shares up across all the
consumer types at different inventory states to calculate the aggregate market shares.
I assume the individual persistent tastes for price αPi are distributed as independently
normal random variables, which can be broken into two parts – a population average and an
individual deviation: αPi = α
P + σP vi . Let the population constitute the consumer types
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and their corresponding population weight (vi, wi) . I use the Monte-Carlo approach to
draw ns random sample vi using Halton sequences and to set wi =
1
ns . Among the group of
consumers of type i, a pE proportion among them is the “enthusiastic” type, and a 1− pE
proportion is the “neutral” type. I use sOwnit(g
0b0, λ) to denote the share of consumers
of type i and λi whose current inventory type equals (g
0 b0) ∈ {∅∅, lC, hC, lN, hN}. In the
model, every consumer starts with the empty inventory state. When a consumer of type
i and λi makes a purchase, she stays with the same preference type; only her inventory
changes and the distribution of sOwnit(g
0b0, λ) is updated.
Given a consumer of type i and λi, the probability that the consumer will purchase
product j from brand b(j) and product-line group g(j) at time t can be described as:
sˆjt(i, λi) =
∑
g0b0
sOwnit(g
0b0, λi)× Pr(j, g(j)b(j)|Zit, λi, {δfigbt}).
Summing the type-specific market shares across different consumer types, I get the
aggregate market shares for a particular camera model j from brand b(j) and product-line
group g(j) as:
sˆjt =
∑
i
wi × (sˆjt(i, E)× pE + sˆjt(i,N)× (1− pE)). (10)
2.4 Econometric Model
2.4.1 Estimation
This subsection discusses the estimation of the structural parameters, θ ≡ {αx, αP , σP ,
φ, γl, γh, λ
E , pE}, which include the dynamic and static parameters.40 My estimation
strategy resembles the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach used by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (BLP) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012). I supplement
their moments with new sets of micro moments to incorporate consumer learning and the
40Note that the parameter λi takes the value λ
E with probability pE , and takes the value λN normalized
to 1 with probability 1− pE . λE , pE are parameters to be estimated.
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switching cost.
2.4.1.1 The Micro Moments
The idea of using micro moments derives from Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (2004). They suggest using additional information about purchasers or rich sources
of information about how consumers choose, like “second-choice” data, to help identify
demand parameters. In my case, the Flickr data, which tracks individual use of cameras,
provide valuable information about consumers’ repurchasing behavior. Essentially, the
GMM estimation algorithm picks up the parameter estimates to match the model predictions
with the observed conditional choice probabilities from the Flickr data.
I set two sets of micro moments. I first match that average probability which consumers
will choose their previous brands conditional on repurchasing. These moments are given by:
E[{i purchase new camera fromC} | {b0it = C, repurchase}], (11)
E[{i purchase new camera fromN} | {b0it = N, repurchase}], (12)
where {i purchase new camera fromB} | {b0it = B, repurchase} is the event that a con-
sumer who currently owns a camera from brand B repurchases a new camera from brand
B, conditional on repurchasing. Specifically, the model prediction (11) equals:41
1
T×ns
∑
i
∑
t
∑
g,g′∈{l,h} sit(gC, λi|C)× Prit(g′C|gC, λi, {δf})/Prit(purchase|gC, λi, {δf}),
where T is the time span in the model, and ns is the total number of consumers that differ
in their persistent preference types. sit(gC, λ|C) is the share of type λi consumers who are
currently at inventory state gC compared to consumers who have cameras from brand C.
Prit(purchase|gC, λi, {δf}) is the probability that consumer i of type λi will go to market
41Model prediction (12) can be calculated in a similar way.
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to make a purchase at time t. Thus, dividing Prit(g
′C|gC, λi, {δf}) by the probability of
purchase at time t gives the conditional probability that a consumer will choose a new
camera from g′C when repurchasing.
Second, I also match the average probability that consumers will choose product-line
group for new cameras conditional on repurchasing. These moments are given by:
E[{i purchase new low − end camera } | {g0it = l, repurchase}], (13)
E[{i purchase new high− end camera } | {g0it = h, repurchase}], (14)
where {i purchase new low − end camera } | {g0it = l, repurchase} is the event that a
consumer who currently owns a low-end camera purchases a new low-end camera conditional
on repurchasing. Specifically, the model prediction (13) equals:42
1
T×ns
∑
i
∑
t
∑
b,b′∈{C,N} sit(lb, λi|l)× Prit(lb′|lb, λi, {δf})/Prit(purchase|lb, λi, {δf}),
where sit(lb, λi|l) is the share of type λi consumers who are currently at the inventory state
lb compared to consumers who currently own low-end cameras. Note the composition of
type λi consumers in the product-line group changes over time.
2.4.1.2 The BLP Moments
The BLP moments add two constraints. The first constraint requires that the model’s
predicted market shares equal the observed shares, sj , conditional on parameters θ. The
second constraint relates to the demand shock ξjt, which is assumed to be orthogonal to
instruments Zjt as some functions of observable characteristics xjt. Thus:
E[ξjt(θ)Zjt] = 0.
42Model prediction (14) can be calculated in a similar way.
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where the instrument Zjt includes the sum of product characteristics of other products in
the brand; the sum of product characteristics of the other brand; product characteristics and
total number of products offered in the market. In addition, let Fjt = xjtα
x+ξjt as the mean
flow utility/quality for product j at time t.43 Thus we can compute ξ(θ) = Fjt(θ)− xjtαx,
where I solve the vector Fjt(θ) so that the predicted market shares equal the observed
shares:
sˆj(Fjt(θ), θ)− sj = 0, ∀j ∈ 1, ...J
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) shows existence and uniqueness when all models are
substitutes. However, Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012) shows that there is no guarantee
of uniqueness of the solution under the dynamic demand environment, because under
dynamics, models can be complements with each other. Hence, I assume:
Assumption 3 For every parameter θ, there is a unique vector Fjt that satisfies: sˆj(Fjt(θ),
θ) = sj.
2.4.1.3 The GMM Objective Function
The micro moments and the BLP moments enter the GMM criteria function. The population
moment conditions are assumed to equal zero uniquely at the true θ0, i.e E(G(θ0)) = 0. I
estimate parameters to satisfy:
θˆ = argminθ G(θ)
′
WG(θ),
where W is a weighting matrix, a consistent estimate of the inverse of the asymptotic
variance-covariance matrix of the moments.44 In practice, for the micro-moments part, I
expand the BLP variance-covariance matrix by a diagonal matrix of n1 × n1 dimension,
43Note that fijt = Fjt + α
P
i pjt. I have only one random coefficient on price in practice.
44For the BLP moments, I first obtain a consistent estimator θ1setting the initial weighting matrix to
w1 = Z
′
Z, and then construct the efficient weighting matrix using θ1.
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where n1 is the number of moments I used as micro moments. Each of the diagonal
elements equals the inverse of the variance of the corresponding moments from the data. I
approximate the variance of moments using mdata× (1−mdata)/Nflickr, where mdata is the
moment observed in data, and Nflickr is the number of cameras ever purchased in Flickr
data. This weighting matrix emphasizes on the micro moments, which is appropriate since
I want to match those micro moments closely to data.
2.4.1.4 Identification
I do not attempt to estimate the discount rate β, as the discount factor in dynamic discrete
choice models is typically under-identified (see Rust, 1994). In this setting, a high discount
rate or a moderate preference for DSLR camera characteristics leads consumers to wait to
make their initial purchase. Thus, I set β = 0.98 for the monthly level data.
Components of αx and αPi are identified from time variation in sales when the products
change. In the demand model, consumers are ex-ante homogeneous in their expected
valuation for low-end and high-end cameras, and they are only heterogeneous in terms of
taste for price. The population mean of αPi — α
P is determined by the variation of prices
across products and over time. The standard deviation of αPi — σ
P is identified by the pace
at which consumers initially adopt cameras. When the random coefficient is a constant
term (σp = 0), everyone makes his/her initial purchase at once. However, when σp is large,
people initially adopt cameras gradually. With substantial heterogeneity, consumers will
respond to price differently. People who do not care about price will buy early and may
choose relatively expensive cameras; others who do care about price will wait longer to buy
and tend to buy cheap cameras.
The switching cost parameter φ is identified by matching the micro moments of brand
transitions; it measures how the past choice of brands affects the current choice of brands.
In a world with extremely high switching costs, we will see that few people migrate to
another brand when they repurchase cameras. When there is no switching cost, the choice
probabilities of brands equals what a static logit model would predict; the past choice of
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brands does not affect the current choice of brands. Thus the probability consumers will
switch brands when repurchasing is directly linked to the size of the switching cost.
Flow utility of usage parameters,γl, γh, and learning parameters, λ
E , pE , are identified
by matching micro moments of product-line group transitions. The difference between
the probability that consumers will purchase high-end cameras in initial purchases and in
latter purchases identifies λE and pE . Combining aggregate market shares and product-line
transition probabilities, data show initially most people choose low-end cameras rather than
high-end cameras. This initial product-line choice probability pins down the probabilities
of enthusiastic type, pE and the average flow utility of usage. When the probability is
low, people tend to buy cheap low-end cameras at the start; they do not expect they will
come to value a high-end camera. Moreover, the probability that many people upgrade to
high-end cameras when repurchasing identifies the value of λE . If λE = 1, meaning there
is no heterogeneity in the value of λi ex-post among consumers, the product-line choice
probabilities do not change after consumers learn their types. In such a case, people will
continue to purchase cameras that have similar characteristics as their previous choice;
they will not systematically upgrade to high-end cameras. When a significant number of
people are observed transitioning from low-end cameras to high-end cameras, I can link the
behavior to a high value of λE learned by the consumer.
2.4.2 Computation
To estimate the demand model, I use the approach used in Gowrisankaran and Rys-
man (2012), which extends the methods of Rust (1987), and Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995). Given a set of initial guesses of mean flow utility Fjt and non-linear parameters
{αP , σP , φ, γl, γh, λE , pE},45 I first calculate the inclusive flow values for each product
group. The inclusive flow values determine consumers’ expectations about the evolution of
the state of the industry. I then use these inclusive flow values and consumers’ expectations
45In practice, I define γˆl = log(γl), γˆh = log(γh − γl) and I search over γˆl, γˆl instead. Note I assume that
γh > γl > 0.
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to solve the dynamic programing problem using the function iteration method. The inclu-
sive flow values, expectations and dynamic programing problem are calculated and solved
separately for each consumer type and each inventory type. Given the value functions, I
construct the choice probabilities for each consumer type i and λi using simulation. By
aggregating the choice probabilities across types of individuals, I can then calculate market
shares for each product predicted by the model. In order to get the set of
−→
Fjt that matches
model predicted market shares with the data, I use a contraction mapping algorithm that
is similar to that used in BLP:46
−→
F ′jt =
−→
Fjt + η(ln(sˆj(Fjt(θ), θ))− ln(sj)) ∀j, t ,
Using the realized ~F from the above fixed point algorithm, I can recover the unobservable
utility components, ξjt, given parameters θ and compute the micro-moments predicted by
the model. Then I can form the GMM objective function using ξjt and the micro-moments.
Finally, I perform a simplex search over the nonlinear parameters to find the parameters
that minimize the GMM objective function.
Discretization and function approximations are used in the demand estimation. I
discretize the four-dimensional state space of inclusive flow values using 256 grid points.
The convergence of value functions is evaluated at these grid points. The values off the grid
points are interpolated using simplicial linear interpolation.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results: Demand Estimates
Table 2.2 displays the estimates of demand parameters. First, two consumer types, enthu-
siastic and neutral consumers, significantly differ in their valuations of high-end cameras
ex-post. On average, high-end cameras deliver much higher flow utility than do low-end
cameras for all consumers. In addition, the 95% confidence interval of enthusiastic con-
46Where η = 0.1. It is a tuning parameter I set to improve convergence.
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sumers’ valuation of high-end cameras lies in [3.395, 8.903], which is larger than neutral
consumers’ valuation (normalized to 1). Enthusiastic consumers constitute 20.9% of the
total population. The other dimension of consumer heterogeneity is the price coefficient.
The price coefficient is negative. The standard deviation shows a fairly large heterogeneity
in the dis-utility of price. Consumers who are not very price-sensitive tend to buy early
and thus learn their tastes early.
Second, there is a fairly large cost of switching brands. Estimates show that consumers
experience a dis-utility of 0.760 on average if they repurchase a camera from a new brand. In
terms of magnitude, the average switching cost is $155.04 while the sales-weighted average
price of a DSLR camera is $1298.35.47
Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Nonlinear
std of price σP 0.665∗∗ 0.267
mean of price αP −5.469∗∗∗ 1.573
switching cost φ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.033
E-type valuation λE 6.149∗∗∗ 1.405
fraction of E-type pE 0.209∗∗∗ 0.009
low-end camera utility γl 3.566e
−4 0.049
high-end camera utility γh 0.092
∗∗∗ 0.020
resolution 3.783∗∗∗ 0.618
sensor size 2.648∗∗∗ 0.610
Linear
max shutter speed 3.312∗∗∗ 0.560
dimension −6.466∗∗∗ 2.109
age −0.037 0.037
age2 −0.001 0.001
Canon dummy −1.143∗∗∗ 0.383
# DSLR camera obs: 1233
# of market share obs: 453
1 I log all continuous variables including price. Monthly fixed effect and
time trend are also included.
2 ** at 5 percent level, *** at 1 percent level.
Finally, coefficients of characteristic estimates are of expected signs and most of them
are significant. On average, consumers like DSLR camera models with high resolution,
47 To translate the switching cost estimate into dollars, I divide it by the estimated marginal utility of
price.
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large sensor size, high shutter speed and portability. The age of products, measured by
months since introduction, has increasingly negative effects on the value of products. These
preferences for characteristics are consistent with intuition.
2.5.1.1 Model Fit
Table 2.3: Model Fit: Micro Moments
Repurchase Transitions
Canon→Canon Nikon→ Nikon
Data 68.47% 62.92%
Model 70.46% 59.54%
low-end→low-end high-end→high-end
Data 76.97% 31.25%
Model 81.63% 30.57%
I find the demand model fits the micro moments reasonably well. Table 2.3 displays
the model predictions of repurchase transition probabilities and repurchase probabilities,
compared with the corresponding means from the Flickr data. The model predicts that a
large proportion of consumers will stick to their previous brand, and this phenomenon agrees
with data. As to product-line choices in replacement purchase, 18.37% (compared to 23.03%
in Flickr data) of consumers will move from low-end cameras to high-end cameras. In
addition, I plot the averaged error term, ξjt, over time, and I find no evidence of systematic
auto-correlation or heteroscedasticity (see Figure 2.4).
2.5.2 Results: Estimated Value and Purchase Dynamics
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated choice-specific value functions for one representative indi-
vidual in the estimation. They measure the attractiveness of purchasing each combination
of brand and product-line group (ignoring the cost of switching brands) on the market
over time. Two features are important. First, for enthusiastic consumers, the values of
purchasing high-end cameras surpass the values of purchasing low-end cameras ex-post.
However, for neutral consumers, the values of purchasing low-end cameras are relatively
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Figure 2.4: Average Estimation Error ξjt by Month
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higher. Second, both enthusiastic and neutral consumers share homogeneous ex-ante beliefs
about type probability and values of purchasing. After mid-2003, the ex-ante values of
purchasing low-end cameras became higher than those of high-end cameras. These values
imply that, after 2003, when consumers are uncertain about their types, they are likely to
start with low-end cameras. In addition, those enthusiastic consumers who have already
learned their types are more likely to purchase expensive high-end DSLR cameras when
repurchasing. In contrast, neutral consumers who have already learned their types are
satisfied with their low-end cameras and have no incentive to upgrade to high-end cameras.
Overall, the estimated model replicates the key patterns in Flickr data.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the fraction of the Canon/Nikon camera sales that comes
from different consumer groups. Specifically, I distinguish sales from first-purchase between
sales from repurchase, as well as sales from enthusiastic consumers between sales from
neutral consumers. There are two note-worthy features. First, for all cameras, sales from
repurchasing are important for sales in the long run. For example, for low-end cameras, by
the end of the time, around 50% of sales come from repurchase. Moreover, for high-end
cameras, by the end of the time, about 90% of sales come from repurchase. The DSLR
camera market is a relatively mature market. Thus, quality improvement and price decrease
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Choice-specific Values
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become increasingly important for firms to encourage the existing consumers to repurchase
new DSLR cameras. Second, enthusiastic consumers’ repurchases will be crucial for the
sales of high-end Canon and Nikon DSLR cameras, when the uncertainties of consumer
types are gradually resolved through consumer learning.48
2.5.3 Results: Price Elasticities
In this model, consumers are heterogeneous in unobserved product-line group tastes as well
as price sensitivity. This subsection focuses on the distinction between enthusiastic and
neutral consumers, and shows that the taste heterogeneity and the learning process lead to
big differences in these consumers’ demand elasticities and dynamic consumption patterns.
I analyze dynamic price elasticity for a permanent 1% price increase in one brand and
48Note that consumers also differ greatly in their price sensitivities. The repurchase sales are mainly
coming from those less sensitive consumers.
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Figure 2.6: Fraction of Consumer Types in Canon’s Sales
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Figure 2.7: Fraction of Consumer Types in Nikon’s Sales
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product-line category, using the coefficients in Table 2.2. I assume price change starts taking
place in one chosen month,49 and the price increases unexpectedly for consumers before that
chosen time. For all specifications, I assume consumers retain the same perception of how
{δilbt} evolve in the industry; the h0 and h1 remain the same as in the demand estimation.
However, consumers use the realized δilbt under the new price to make predictions about
the state of the industry.
Figure 2.8: Permanent Price Increase of Low-end Canon
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0 10 20 30
month
Own-elasticity(%): low-end Canon
-1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
month
Cross-elasticity(%): high-end Canon
-1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
month
Cross-elasticity(%): low-end Nikon
-1
0
1
2
0 10 20 30
month
Cross-elasticity(%): high-end Nikon
Enthusiastic Neutral
Figure 2.8 shows the change of demand in response to a permanent 1% price increase of
low-end Canon cameras, separately by enthusiastic and neutral consumer types.50There are
three noteworthy points. First, the heterogeneity in product-line tastes and the consumer
learning of types cause enthusiastic consumers and neutral consumers to respond differently
to the permanent 1% price increase of low-end Canon cameras. Given the permanent price
increase, the sales of high-end Canon cameras to neutral consumers increases to about 1.4%,
due to substitution effects. However, the sales of high-end Canon cameras to enthusiastic
49I chose August 2004. It’s in the middle of my data sample for demand estimation.
50 I calculate the elasticities by altering the price of DSLR cameras uniformly for all models in low-end
Canon camera categories by 1% after the chosen month.The elasticities in response to price increase in
another product category are calculated similarly.
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Figure 2.9: Permanent Price Increase of Low-end Nikon
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consumers only increase in the first 8 months after the price change but decrease over time,
bottoming out at −0.6% by the end of the time. These patterns suggest that the learning
and upgrading behaviors of enthusiastic consumers play an important role. After the price
of low-end Canon cameras is increased, many price-sensitive consumers will choose not to
purchase or to delay their purchase of low-end Canon cameras. Thus, this experimental
demand system will end up with a smaller customer base of low-end Canon camera holders
than the original demand system.51 Thus, fewer enthusiastic consumers will learn their
types through purchase, and fewer of these consumers will purchase high-end Canon or
Nikon cameras in the long run, leading to the decreasing elasticities of high-end cameras
among enthusiastic consumers.
Second, the model implies that with enough heterogeneity in valuation among con-
sumers, the demand for high-end and low-end products produced by the same firm can
be complementary. For this 1% price increase of low-end Canon cameras, the total sale of
51This low-end Canon customer base excludes some more price-sensitive consumers, who are in general
less likely to purchase high-end cameras. However, it also excludes those enthusiastic consumers among the
more price-sensitive group, who could have the potential to upgrade once they learned their types through
purchase.
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high-end cameras will decrease to about −0.4% to −0.5% at the end of the time.
Third, the switching cost also plays a considerable role. Combining consumer learning
and the existence of switching costs, the model implies consumers are likely to upgrade to
high-end cameras from the same brand as they initially purchased. Faced with the price
increase in low-end Canon cameras, many consumers will instead purchase low-end Nikon
cameras for their initial purchases. Thus, in the long run, the growth of the customer
base of low-end Nikon cameras will lead to additionally increased sales of high-end Nikon
cameras. At the same time, the decline of the customer base of low-end Canon cameras has
a larger impact on the potentially decreased sales of high-end Canon cameras than on the
potentially decreased sales of high-end Nikon cameras. In addition, Figure 2.9 shows how
demand changes in response to a permanent 1% price increase of low-end Nikon cameras;
these changes share similar patterns.
Figure 2.10: Permanent Price Increase of High-end Canon
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Finally, let’s look at the change of demand in response to a permanent 1% price increase
among high-end Canon or Nikon DSLR cameras (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11). The patterns
reveal two points. First, high-end Canon and high-end Nikon cameras are close substitutes,
yet the price increase of high-end cameras barely impacts the sale of low-end cameras.
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Figure 2.11: Permanent Price Increase of High-end Nikon
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Second, enthusiastic consumers are less price sensitive to the price increase of high-end
cameras, and they are likely to substitute to high-end cameras of the other brand when
faced with the price increase. The different responses between enthusiastic and neutral
consumers are driven by their different valuations of high-end cameras.
Chapter 3
Supply-Side Simulations: Pricing and Welfare
Implications
3.1 Implications for Pricing
Given the estimated demand system, I solve for Canon and Nikon’s optimal pricing problem.
To make the problem tractable, I make several simplifications. First, I restrict firms to
selling only two products (a low-end DSLR camera and a high-end DSLR camera for each
firm) to reduce the computational burden. Second, I assume that these products have
qualities that improve exogenously but have prices that remain constant over time.1 Thus, I
neglect the intertemporal price discrimination incentives for durable goods (see Nair (2007),
Conlon (2012)) that exist in reality, which are interesting but beyond the scope of this
paper.2
At the beginning of the time, firm b ∈ {C,N} sets two prices (Plb, Phb) for its low-end
and high-end products to maximize a discounted stream of future profits W Tb that lasts T
1The estimated demand system provides average qualities qjgbt = xjgbtα
x + ξjgbt (net of price) associated
with each product. Using these qualities, I can compute the aggregated average qualities of cameras from
each brand and product-line category at time t using aggregation properties of the extreme value distribution.
I then impute these aggregated average qualities in the supply side when solving the optimal pricing problem.
2It is challenging to solve a dynamic competition model consisting of multiple products that allows
consumers to be forward looking.
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periods with discount factor β:3
W Tb = max
Plb,Phb
T∑
t=1
βt−1pibt(Qt;Plb, Phb),
where Qt ≡ {QtlC , QthC , QtlN , QthN} are the qualities of the four products on the market at
time t. Also, pibt(Q
t;Plb, Phb) = salelbt ∗ (Plb −MClb) + salehbt ∗ (Phb −MChb) is the profit
of firm b at time t, where salelbt and salehbt are the sales of low-end and high-end products
of firm b at time t, and MClb and MChb are the marginal costs of low-end and high-end
products of firm b that are constants.4 As a result, firms are assumed to earn a flat mark-up
for each of their products over time. This demand system is described by the product
qualities and estimated demand preference parameter θ. As in the estimated demand
system, consumers are forward-looking and have rational expectations of the evolution
of their utilities of purchase; these utilities depend on the evolution of product qualities
and the fixed prices set by the firms. At each time period, a consumer makes dynamic
purchase decisions to maximize her expected discounted utility, yielding value function
that satisfies Bellman’s equations.5 I consider the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this
game, extending the equilibrium concept to require that the forward-looking consumer’s
expectation is consistent with firms’ optimal pricing strategy.6
3T equals 53 months, which is the number of periods observed in the demand side. I solve the game that
lasts for a relatively long period of time, since the process in which consumers make purchases, learn their
types and upgrade takes time.
4The marginal costs for low-end and high-end products are imputed to the supply side. I assume
symmetric marginal costs between firms. The decline of marginal costs is not modeled.
5I assume consumers perceive the markets will still evolve even after the period T .
6The numerical algorithm contains two loops. The inner loop solves the firms’ and consumers’ maximiza-
tion problem given the current price guess. The outside loop updates the price guess until convergence is
achieved. Note that for each guess of prices, consumers need to update their rational expectations and value
functions.
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3.1.1 Static Pricing (Experiment 1)
The goal of the first counterfactual is to quantify the relative importance of firms’ static
and dynamic pricing incentives. In this subsection, I consider firms that engage in static
pricing.7 Such firms do not take into account how current prices will affect future demand.
Vertically-differentiated products only serve as tools to segment consumers with different
price sensitivities.
Table 3.1: Static Pricing
($) P b∗l P
b∗
h Markupl Markuph
β = 0
Canon 1262.8 3594.0 330.4 1020.7
Nikon 1254.1 3277.3 321.7 704.0
β = 0.98
Canon 1220.3 4102.7 287.9 1529.4
Nikon 1230.8 3641.6 298.4 1068.3
I find that the optimal prices for low-end products are higher when firms engage in
static pricing, and the optimal prices for high-end products are lower, as Table 3.1 shows.
Specifically, a forward-looking Canon gives up 12.9% of markup selling one low-end DSLR
camera, and a forward-looking Nikon gives up 7.2% of markup selling one low-end DSLR
camera. Canon has a higher incentive to invest in its customer base to induce future sales of
high-end products, given the higher estimated quality of high-end Canon cameras compared
to that of Nikon.
Table 3.2: Static Pricing under No learning
Supply P b∗l P
b∗
h Profitsl Profitsh
($ markup) ($ markup) (million $)
β = 0
Canon 1241.6(309.2) 4414.1(1840.8) 5.3 261.8
Nikon 8093.6(7161.2) 3813.4(1240.0) 0.0 96.1
Demand Salebl (1000#) Sale
b
h (1000#)
Enthusiastic type Neutral type Enthusiastic type Neutral type
β = 0
Canon 0.0 17.1 142.2 0.0
Nikon 0.0 0.0 77.5 0.0
7I use the averaged quality over time as the product quality in this experiment for comparison.
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As a comparison, I further consider the case when consumers know their types, enthusi-
astic or neutral, at the beginning. That is to say, consumers no longer need to learn about
their types through purchase. Table 3.2 shows optimal prices and the corresponding demand.
Under this setting, the demand system degenerates to the static price discrimination. Firms
price products to segment the market and to extract the most profits from enthusiastic
consumers. For example, Nikon chooses to only offer one high-end product to serve the
enthusiastic consumers.8 Canon offers both products and prices its low-end product at a
relatively high markup to induce enthusiastic (neutral) consumers to only purchase high-end
(low-end) products.
3.1.2 Change of Switching Costs (Experiment 2)
In this subsection, I solve for Canon’s and Nikon’s optimal pricing problem, given different
values of switching costs. Table 3.3 shows firms’ optimal prices as well as total discounted
profits under different specifications.
Table 3.3: Pricing with Different Switching Costs
Switching P b∗l P
b∗
h Total Profits: Profitsl Profitsh
Cost ($ markup) ($ markup) (million $)
0
Canon 1288.5(356.1) 4112.6(1539.3) 374.0 320.9 53.1
Nikon 1277.2(344.8) 3835.3(1262.0) 322.9 304.8 18.1
0.5φˆ
Canon 1259.6(327.3) 4231.5(1658.2) 343.6 282.0 61.6
Nikon 1254.1(321.8) 3736.2(1162.9) 281.7 260.5 21.2
φˆ
Canon 1216.3(284.0) 4734.3(2161.0) 340.2 250.1 90.1
Nikon 1229.2(296.9) 3899.7(1326.4) 257.6 224.7 32.9
5φˆ
Canon 951.3(18.9) 7830.7(5257.4) 445.5 26.4 419.1
Nikon 1002.9(70.5) 6520.1(3946.8) 195.0 53.8 141.2
10φˆ
Canon 906.4(−25.9) 8167.6(5594.3) 373.2 −35.0 408.2
Nikon 963.4(31.0) 6966.8(4393.5) 131.7 19.7 112.0
I find that the optimal prices for low-end products decrease as the switching cost
8The price for Nikon low-end products is so high that there are almost no sales.
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increases, and, at the same time, the optimal prices for high-end products tend to increase.
This result is driven by the long-term complementary relationship between low-end and
high-end products of the same firm, due to the existence of consumer learning and switching
costs. In general, larger switching costs increase firms’ incentives to accelerate consumer
learning and invest in their customer bases, as more consumers will remain with their
original brands when they repurchase and especially upgrade products. Thus, the low-end
product serves as a tool for firms to “invest”, as the profits coming from the low-end product
fall when the switching cost increases. In addition, the high-end product serves as a tool for
firms to “harvest” those high valuation consumers who have already learned their types and
are “locked-in”.9 When the switching cost is 10 times the estimated value, firms compete
fiercely in prices of low end products that, for example, Canon is willing to price its low-end
product below the marginal cost.
Aggressive pricing of low-end products in the high switching cost counterfactual drives
consumers to adopt DSLR cameras. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the demand evolution for
all four products under different switching cost specifications. In the high switching cost
counterfactual, Canon’s sales of low-end product increase significantly. This growth in
Canon’s customer base successfully translates into a significant increase in the sales of
high-end Canon cameras in later months, even given the high price of the high-end Canon
product in this counterfactual. Total consumer welfare increases as well (see Table 3.4).
In addition, the high switching cost environment puts Nikon at a disadvantage in
competition. Forward-looking consumers take into consideration the possibility of upgrading
and “locking-in” given the high switching cost. Consumers will be less likely to choose
Nikon since the estimated quality of the high-end Nikon product is worse than that of the
9These results in the table can be compared to the static results of “tie-in sale” problem, where firms
conduct second-degree price discrimination. In the “tie-in sale” problem, the demand for the tied product
“meters” the valuations of consumers (Burstein, 1960). Compared to perfect competitive price for the tied
good, the price of the complementary (tied) good is higher in the tie-in price discrimination case, while the
price of the basic good is lower under the tied-in price discrimination case. In my case, low-end products are
gateway products for most consumers: buying these, consumers learn about their preferences. Enthusiastic
consumers, who value using high-end products, are likely to repurchase high-end products. Thus high-end
products are similar to the tied products that “meter” consumers’ willingness to pay.
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Table 3.4: Consumer Welfare Comparison
Competition Switching cost Consumer Welfare
φ 100
0 103.9
Duopoly 0.5φ 101.4
5φ 112.7
10φ 118.0
Monopoly - 65.4
high-end Canon product. As a result, Nikon’s sales of the low-end product decreases in the
high-switching cost counterfactual, even given its low price (see Figure 3.1). Nikon’s total
discounted profit also falls when the switching cost increases.
Figure 3.1: Low-end DSLR Camera Sales with Different Switching Costs
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3.1.3 Change of Market Structure (Experiment 3)
In this subsection, I simulate a merger between Canon and Nikon and solve for the optimum
pricing problem.
This ownership consolidation gives firms incentives to eliminate switching costs by
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Figure 3.2: High-end DSLR Camera Sales with Different Switching Costs
5
10
15
Sa
les
(1
00
0)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Time
High-end Canon
5
10
15
Sa
les
(1
00
0)
2003 2004 2005 2006
Time
High-end Nikon
1/2 SC SC
10 SC
decreasing the number of products offered.10 Moreover, the optimum prices for low-end
products are lower compared to those in the original duopoly case, while the optimum
prices for high-end products are higher. Under the monopoly case, the firm makes a
large profit, which is higher than the sum of Canon and Nikon’s profits under the duopoly
competition case. However, this aggressive pricing of low-end product does not translate into
consumer surplus due to two reasons (See table 3.4). First, product elimination decreases
consumer welfare since consumers have fewer choices. Second, the high price of high-end
product offsets consumers’ incentives to adopt low-end products initially through consumers’
expectation.
This result echoes some of the previous findings. On one hand, removing competition
allows the monopoly firm to raise its products’ prices. On the other hand, the monopoly
firm faces no competition selling high-end products to harvest high valuation consumers.
10This is because the profits mainly come from selling high-end products in this setting. For the monopoly
firm, offering 4 products may increase the sales of low-end products. However, at the same time, this would
actually decrease the sales of high-end products, due to switching costs.
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Thus, the monopoly firm has an even bigger incentive to invest in a customer base by
pricing low-end products at a low markup. The second effect dominates in this monopoly
counterfactual.
Table 3.5: Monopoly vs. Duopoly
P b∗l P
b∗
h Total Profits: Profitsl Profitsh
($ markup) ($ markup) (million $)
Monopoly
Canon 1105.2(172.8) 9110.6(6537.3)
1359.0 352.5 1006.5
Nikon ∞ ∞
Duopoly Canon 1216.3(284.0) 4734.3(2161.0) 340.2 250.1 90.1
Nikon 1229.2(296.9) 3899.7(1326.4) 257.6 224.7 32.9
Figure 3.3: DSLR Camera Sales under Different Market Structures
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Chapter 4
A Model of Dynamic R&D Investment with
Uncertain Innovation
4.1 Introduction
Firms engage in Research and Development (R&D) activities to achieve process and product
innovations. R&D investments is the key driver for innovations, and innovations have a
large impact on firms’ values. A noteworthy feature of activities in R&D and innovation is
that these are inherently highly uncertain. For example, firms are likely to invest in research
projects lasting longer than one year. More importantly, increasing R&D investment may
increase likelihood a firm will develop successful innovations, but there is always possibility
of failure.
However, mainly due to the lack of data, economists mostly have treated the production
of innovation production as a “black box” without taking account of the uncertainties
discussed above. For example, previous research always simply uses R&D expenditure or
the number of patents as a proxy for innovation in a regression. An ideal approach would
be to link the process that begins with a firm’s decision to engage in R&D activities to the
firm’s use of innovations in improving its profitability (Crepon et al. (1998)). I use this
approach to take advantage of a firm-level data set that has detailed information of R&D
activities and innovation output. In addition, I developed a structural model of dynamic
R&D investment to incorporate the uncertainties of R&D activities.
I introduced several new features in my structural model. First, I estimate a probability
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function to account for the uncertainties in the production of innovation. In addition,
I explicitly account for the fact that it is not innovation input (R&D) but innovation
output that affects the profit function. Once innovation happens, a firm’s product quality
improves, and quality affects the firm’s profit function directly. Thus, my model includes
two relationships: the innovation equation relating R&D investment to innovation output,
and the quality evolution function relating innovation output to quality improvement, the
latter of which directly influences firm’s profitability.
In my model, firms accumulate a stock of knowledge capital by making periodic R&D
investments. This knowledge capital affects the probability of obtaining innovation. I also
include a fixed cost for R&D investment to generate relatively large but infrequent positive
investment patterns; these patterns are a common feature of much R&D data. Firm’s
R&D investment decisions feature the usual trade-off: By paying to invest, the probability
of achieving an innovation that will increase revenue increases. However, if firms do not
invest, they could save that money today at a cost of a lower probability of achieving an
innovation.
My empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I estimated the probability of
achieving innovation using a logit model. Second, I incorporate firm’s dynamic discrete
choice to invest in R&D into my model in order to recover the fixed costs of this investment.
Conceptually, this step is simple. I employ maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to
find the fixed cost parameters of R&D that would maximize the likelihood of observing
the actual R&D behaviors in the data. From these estimates, I am able to simulate a
counterfactual policy that allows me to analyze how firms respond to R&D subsidies.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
I use a data set consisting of (unbalanced) observations on more than 2300 Spanish
manufacturing firms during the period 1990-2006. The data come from the Encuesta Sobre
Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE) survey, a firm-level survey of Spanish manufacturing
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sponsored by the Ministry of Industry. At the beginning of this survey in 1990, 5% of firms
with up to 200 workers were sampled randomly by industry. All firms with more than 200
workers were asked to participate, and 70% of all firms of this size chose to respond.
The data provide detailed information of firms’ R&D activities and innovation outcomes
for up to 17 years. The R&D input includes R&D spending in levels and number of
employment. I define a firm’s R&D action rt at time t equals 1 if the firm reports a
positive level of R&D spending, and rt equals 0 otherwise. The R&D output includes the
introduction of a process or a product innovation (self-reported), indicated by dummy
variables (0 or 1).
Table 4.1: R&D Investment Rate and Innovation Rate
Industry R&D rate Innovation rate # of observation
1. Metal products 33.94% 43.68% 2628
2. Non-metalic minerals 33.01% 34.32% 1445
3. Chemical products 55.91% 53.00% 2466
4. Agricultural machinery 51.91% 49.40% 1595
5. Electrical goods 55.58% 52.01% 1738
6. Transport equipment 54.39% 55.19% 1368
7. Food,drink and tobacco 28.36% 37.84% 2796
8. Textile,leather and shoes 28.01% 35.01% 2713
9. Timber and furniture 20.60% 39.73% 1631
10. Paper products 17.13% 34.95% 1588
Table 4.1 reveals that the frequency of zero R&D investment in these firms is high,
reaching 62% on average. In addition, Table 4.1 shows that the ten industries differ markedly
in terms of their R&D activities. Chemical products (3), agricultural and industrial
machinery (4), electronic goods(5) and transport equipment (6) are highly innovative. Most
of the time, they invest in R&D (55%). Metals and metal products (1), non-metallic
minerals (2), food, drink and tobacco (7), and textile, leather and shoes (8) are in an
intermediate position. The frequency of zero R&D is between 65% and 70%. Finally, timber
and furniture (9) and paper and printing products (10) are reluctant to invest in R&D.
Finally, the difference in product/process innovation also exists across different industries;
but the difference is not too large in magnitude.
61
4.3 Model
In this section, I describe a structural dynamic model of R&D investment. The firm starts
at time t = 0. The firm has infinite horizons and discount rate is β. At the beginning
of each period t, a firm has to make R&D investment decisions. The innovation outcome
happens at the end of period t.
To formalize payoffs, at the beginning each time t, the firm decides whether or not to
invest in R&D, and sells its product, described as quality qt. Profit is a function of quality
qt. If the firm decides to invest in R&D at time t (rt = 1), we can define the flow of profit
to be :
Πft = pi
f (qt) + v1t − C(rt) := u(qt, rt = 1) + v1t.
If the firm does not invest in R&D in period t (rt = 0), the flow of profit would be :
Πft = pi
f (qt) + v0t := u(qt, rt = 0) + v0t,
where pif (qt) is the profit the firm earns from selling the product, qt. I assume that
pif (qt) = γ1log(qt), where γ1 is a parameter of the profit function, and the profit function is
assumed to be concave in product quality. Moreover, vjt(j = 0, 1) is an idiosyncratic type 1
extreme-value term, distributed i.i.d across time periods. This shock, which is observed by
the firm but not by econometricians, capture the uncertainties in the market. To account
for the main features of the data documented above, I assume that firms face an fixed
investment cost, C(rt), which helps explain the presence of a significant number of zeros in
the R&D investment data. Accordingly, we parameterize the investment cost function as:
C(rt) = F01{rt>0}.
The accumulation of knowledge capital is determined by past R&D investment and
depreciation processes. The depreciation process are assumed to be stochastic. The
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knowledge capital changes according to the transition probability (0 < p1 < 1):
Kt+1 = Kt + rt − ηkt with ηkt =
 1 Prob. p10 Prob. 1− p1
 .
The innovation outcome is a function of accumulated knowledge capital and is also
assumed to be uncertain. Expenditures in knowledge capital investment enhance the
probability of success; the probability of achieving an innovation (it = 1) at time t is defined
as :
P (it = 1|Kt; θ) = exp(αo + α1Kt)
1 + exp(α0 + α1Kt)
.
If innovation happens, then the quality increases by a certain level. In addition, if the
firm was hit by a depreciation shock, the quality level decreases by one level with some
probability p2:
qt+1 = qt + γ2 · it − ηqt with ηqt =
 1 Prob. p20 Prob. 1− p2
 .
Consider the firm’s optimal dynamic decision. At the beginning of time t, the firm is
faced must choose whether or not to do R&D at time t, and chooses the amount of R&D
investment that maximizes the sum of the expected discounted value of future profits with
the discount factor β, given firm’s information at time t. Let −→v = (v1, v0). In each period,
each firm solves:
maxrtE[
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t(pif (qt) + vt − C(rt))|qt,Kt,−→vt )].
I assume that the firm has all the current information, vt, when making its decision,
but it has no information about the future values of v shocks beyond their distribution.
Future product quality will depend on the probability of having an innovation. The firm
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has expectations about how the quality of future products will evolve.
This problem can be anlyzed as a sequence of decisions using standard techniques. The
state variables in this formulation are shocks −→vt , product quality qt, and current knowledge
capital accumulation Kt. Value function, V (qt,Kt,
−→v ), is defined as the discounted sum of
future profits assuming the firm makes optimal decisions, conditional on the state variables:
Vt(qt,Kt,
−→vt ) = maxrt{pif (qt) + vt − C(rt)) + βE[Vt+1(qt+1,Kt+1,−−→vt+1|qt,Kt, rt)]},
where qt and Kt follow the law of motion defined previously. v1t and v0t are independent
across time, and the problem is stationary conditional on the state variable. The firm’s R&D
investment features the usual trade-off: by investing in R&D, the probability of achieving
an innovation to increase revenue increases. However, if the firm does not invest in R&D, it
can save the money today but risks lower future revenue. We can define E[V (q,K)] as the
expectation over v1t and v0t as:
E[V (q,K)] = E[maxr{pif (q) + v − C(r) + βE[V (q′ ,K ′ |q,K, r)]}], (1)
where we have suppressed the subscripts to emphasize (1) holds for all firms in all periods.
Equation (1) defines a fixed point equation that determines E[V (q,K)].
4.3.1 Parameterization and Estimation
Parameterization. The profit parameter γ1 = 1, the number of knowledge capital level
K¯ = 18, the knowledge capital depreciation probability p1 = 0.2, the number of quality
level Q¯ = 46, the effectiveness of innovation in raising quality level γ2 = 3, the quality
depreciation probability p2 = 0.5, and the discount factor β = 0.9.
Likelihood Function. R&D investment can be either 0 or 1. Using the properties of
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extreme value distribution, (1) becomes:
E[V (q,K)] = log
∑
r=0,1
exp(pif (q)− r + βE[V (q′ ,K ′ |q,K, r)]). (2)
The firm makes decisions of whether or not to invest in R&D at the beginning of period
t. The probability of investing in period t equals:
P (rt = 1|Kt, qt, θ) = Prob{v1t − v0t > C(rt = 1)− βE[V (qt+1,Kt+1|qt,Kt, rt = 1)
+βE[V (qt+1,Kt+1|qt,Kt, rt = 0)}.
Because of the logit assumptions of vt, the R&D investment probability simplifies to a
multinomial logit-like expression:
P (rt = 1|Kt, qt; θ) = A
A+B
,
where A = exp(pif (qt) + v1t − C(rt = 1) + βE[V (qt+1,Kt+1|qt,Kt, rt = 1)) and B =
exp(pif (qt) + v0t + βE[V (qt+1,Kt+1|qt,Kt, rt = 0)]).
The total log likelihood is comprised of probabilities of firms’ R&D investment observa-
tions. We can define our log likelihood function as:
L =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
log(P (rit|Kit, qit; θ)). (3)
Given the likelihood function specified above, I can do the estimation in two steps:
Step 1: estimate α0 and α1, the parameters of the probability function, from data, using
a logistic regression of the probability that knowledge capital affects innovation.
Step 2: estimate the fixed-cost parameter F0 using the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm
following Rust (1987). For each iteration, I solve the dynamic programing problem for
the firm based on equation (2) in the inner loop and use Maximum Likelihood Estimation
in the outer loop. Given each parameter guess, we solve the value function E[V (q,K)]
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for each state. The state space (q,K) (q ∈ {1, ...Q¯}, K ∈ {1, ...K¯}) is discrete and finite .
Given the value functions, I can construct the probabilities of investing in R&D and form
the total likelihood function.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Estimation Results
Table 4.2 shows the estimates for the parameters in the innovation production function. For
those firms which do not invest in R&D at all and stay at the lowest knowledge capital level
(k = 1), the probability of obtaining innovation equals 33.5%. When knowledge capital
reaches 12, the probability of obtaining an innovation increases to almost 90%. Table 4.2
also shows the estimate of the fixed cost of investing in R&D.
Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates
Innovation Production parameters
α0 −0.9401∗∗∗ (0.003)
α1 0.255
∗∗∗ (0.001)
Structural parameters
F0 1.406
∗∗∗ (0.001)
MLE objective function −13767
# of observation 19968
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 illustrate the expected value function and the optimum R&D
investment probabilities as a function of quality and capital given the estimated fixed cost
of investment. As expected, value function is both increasing and concave in q and K. On
the other hand, the higher the quality level, the smaller the probability the firm invest in
R&D as the optimum strategy.
4.4.2 Counterfactual Simulation
The cost of R&D crucially affects firms’ decision to invest in R&D, and thus leads to
different innovation rates and long-run profits. In this subsection, I consider a policy
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intervention of direct R&D subsidies that can reduce the R&D cost by 20%. I take the
estimated parameters, and simulate firms’ response to the reduction of R&D costs for 15
years (I simulate 100 times). Table 4.3 shows the R&D investment rate and quality level
under the counterfactual exercise. After 5 years, we see that reduction of R&D costs would
increase firms’ R&D investment for 23.8%. After 15 years, the reduction of R&D costs
would increase firms’ R&D investment for 19.2%, and the average quality level raises by 6%.
Table 4.3: Reduction in R&D costs
R&D investment in 5 years in 15years
Fˆ0 0.378 0.344
reduction in Fˆ0 0.468 0.410
Quality level
Fˆ0 2.600 7.037
reduction in Fˆ0 2.424 7.453
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Figure 4.1: Value Function
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Figure 4.2: Optimal R&D Investment Policy Function
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In Chapter 2 and 3, I use individual DSLR camera ownership data combined with market
shares data to study consumers’ demand dynamics and firms’ pricing strategies in the
DSLR camera market. It leads to three main conclusions: First, there are substantial
heterogeneities in consumers’ valuation of high-end cameras ex-post and significant costs
of switching brands. Enthusiastic consumers’ repurchases are crucial for the sales of high-
end DSLR cameras, as uncertainties of valuation are gradually resolved. The estimated
demand model implies a dynamic complementary relationship between high-end and low-
end products that are produced by the same firm. Second, this dynamic complementary
relationship between low- and high-end products brings firms new dynamic product-line
pricing incentives, in addition to the static price discrimination incentives. Firms can
set lower prices of their low-end products to invest in their consumer bases and set high
prices of high-end products to harvest those high-valuation consumers who are “locked-in”.
Finally, switching costs between brands increase the incentives of firms to invest in their
customer bases to accelerate consumer learning. The aggressive pricing of low-end products
drives consumers to adopt DSLR cameras and increases consumer welfare. In addition, the
quality of high-end products determines firms’ competitiveness in the high-switching-cost
environment.
The current study is limited in its investigation of market dynamics where we only allow
firms to charge once-for-all prices in the beginning. One could imagine that in more realistic
settings, firms conduct R&D and make product quality choices in addition to pricing choices
every period. For future research, one avenue is to model quality choices in addition to
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pricing decisions. It would also be interesting to examine and quantify distortions in quality
and compare them to the predictions from textbook price discrimination models (Mussa and
Rosen (1978)). In addition, although the exact consumer learning processes and switching
costs are different in different markets, the broad takeaway is that consumer learning and
switching costs do matter. The interaction of consumer learning and switching costs reveals
dynamic complementaries between products produced by one firm, and it has important
implications on firms’ pricing and market dynamics.
In Chapter 4, I utilize a rich dataset that tracks Spanish manufacture firms’ R&D
activities and innovation outcomes for up to 17 years. I posit a dynamic model of firms’
decision of R&D investment that explicitly incorporates the uncertainties in the production
of innovation. I use the estimated model to analyze how firms respond to R&D subsidies.
These chapters of the dissertation have shown the importance of dynamic modeling
of consumers/firms’ behaviors for empirical work. I hope these contributions will spur
future development in the dynamic analysis of economic behaviors in the field of empirical
industrial organization.
Chapter 6
Appendix
Graphs and Tables
Figure 6.1: First Camera Histogram: Never Repurchase vs. Repurchase
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Figure 6.2: Complementary CDF: Proportion of Camera Usage
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics By Brand
Brand Monthly Sales Number of Products
Canon 28587.45 5.65
Nikon 18186.01 4.25
Olympus 5888.50 2.46
Pentax 2128.75 2.84
Sony 5441.20 1.00
1 Nikon entered in 1999; Canon entered in 2001.
2 Olympus and Pentax entered in 2003; Sony entered in
late 2006.
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics of Characteristics
Variable Units Mean Std
Camera Resolution Megapixel 6.51 2.88
Sensor Size Millimeters 404.43 153.98
Max Shutter Speed 1/Seconds 6902.64 4201.45
Lcd Display Size Inch2 2.01 0.26
Dimension Inch3 86.47 28.61
Weight Pound 1.87 0.54
Model Age Month 14.99 11.01
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Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics of Flickr Camera Ownership Data
Statistics Values
# of Individuals 2718
# of DSLR Cameras 4978
Average # of DSLR per user 1.8
% of Single DSLR users 53.5
% of Multiple DSLR users 46.5
Avg Month of Use before replacement 19.2
1 Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of data
sample with ownership restrictions (1) total # of pictures
>= 10; (2) pictures continuously apear >= 5 times.(3)
ownership longer than 30 days.
2 I further restrict the cameras from 5 biggest firms. In
addition, I exclude users that own more than 10 cameras
in ownership history.
Table 6.4: First Camera: Avg # of Pictures Posted in One Year
First Will Percentiles
DSLR Repurchase? Mean 20% 40% 60% 80% Obs
Entry
Yes 154.8 16.0 34.8 70.0 183.8 867
No 102.6 15.7 28.8 49.3 100.0 1008
Mid
Yes 156.6 15.5 33.4 72.9 176.0 305
No 89.4 14.0 26.0 50.3 111.8 358
Semi-prof
Yes 187.4 11.3 34.7 57 130.3 69
No 279.8 14 24 44.3 98 76
Prof
Yes 98.1 7.3 13.3 55 109.8 23
No 284.0 14 43 67 164.3 12
Data Appendix
Flickr Data Collection
I collected a unique panel data set of DSLR camera usage from 2001 till 2013 from Flickr,
using web scraping. Figure 6.3 is an example from Flickr website. We see that this photo
was taken by a DSLR camera model Canon Rebel T3, which is an entry-level DSLR camera.
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Table 6.5: Product Line Transition Among Repurchasers
Entry Mid Semi-Prof Professional
Entry 41.1% 40.7% 17.5% 0.7%
Mid 22.0% 42.8% 29.6% 5.5%
Semi-Prof 14.4% 35.2% 39.2% 11.2%
Professional 9.2% 28.7% 30% 32.2%
1 # transition obs count: From Entry(751); Mid(582); Semi-
Prof(250); Professional(87).
Figure 6.3: Example Photo from Flickr
The time stamp shows this photo was taken on April 29, 2012.
I restrict users to those who uploaded at least one picture taken by a DSLR camera
before January 1, 2012. For each identified user, I collect all the photo information from
their photo history. The raw data set contains a total of 4,839 users and information from
their 6 million (6,213,923) photos. The information includes user ID, photo ID, camera
brand, camera model, whether the camera is a DSLR camera or not, and date when the
picture was taken.
75
Data Cleaning and Computation
The first step is to convert the raw data from photo information to DSLR camera ownership
information. The raw data take up approximately 13 gigabytes. I read in raw data line by
line using scripts written by Python. Each line is information from one photo observation.
The script aggregates the photos into a data structure organized by users and users’ DSLR
camera models that appeared once or more from photo information. The DSLR camera
models appearing in the Flickr data cover almost all DSLR cameras that have ever been
produced by the DSLR firms from the beginning of the industry.1 At the same time, I drop
all photo observations that are taken by non-DSLR camera models. This data structure
is then written to disk for further analysis. Using this data structure, I apply several
conditions to restrict DSLR camera ownership history. The date of the first picture taken
by each camera defines the starting date of ownership. Thus for each user, I am able to get
a sequence of DSLR ownership history in which each point consists of 1) the DSLR camera
model; 2) the starting date of the ownership. I further categorize all the DSLR camera
models into groups of product lines. The next section lists detailed criteria I use to assign
each camera model to a particular product line category.
Product Line Definition: Canon and Nikon
CANON:
• Professional: 1D[2001],1Ds[2002],1DMarkII[2004],1DsMarkII[2004],1DMarkIIN[2005],
1DMarkIII[2007] , 1DsMarkIII[2007], 1D MarkIV[2009] , 1DC/X[2012]2
• Semi-Professional: 5D[2005], 5DMarkII[2008] , 5DMarkIII[2012], 6D[2012]
• Mid-range: D30[2000], D60[2002], 10D[2003], 20D[2004], 30D[2006], 40D[2007], 50D[2008],
60D[2010], 70D[2013],7D[2009]
1The only exception is Nikon 1D, which was introduced in 1999
2The number in brackets is the year when the DSLR model was introduced
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• Entry-level: 300D[2003], 350D[2005],400D[2006], 450D[2008], 500D[2009], 550D[2010],
600D[2011], 650D[2012], 700D[2013], 100D[2013], 1000D[2008], 1100D[2011]
NIKON:
• Professional: D1[1999],D1X[2001], D1H[2001], D2H[2003], D2X[2004], D2Hs[2005],
D2Xs[2006], D3[2007], D3X[2008], D3S[2009], D4[2012]
• Semi-Professional: D700[2008], D800[2012]
• Mid-range: D70[2004], D70s[2005], D80[2006], D90[2008], D90[2008], D7000[2010],
D7100[2013], D100[2002], D200[2005], D300[2007], D300S[2009], D600[2012], D610[2013]
• Entry-level: D40[2006], D3000[2009], D3100[2010], D3200[2012],D50[2005], D40X[2007],
D60[2008],D5000[2009], D5100[2011], D5200[2012]
Alternative Ownership Restrictions: Robustness Check
I also considered alternative ownership restrictions with only: (1) the total number of
pictures taken by this DSLR camera model is larger than 10; (2) the pictures taken by this
DSLR camera model continuously appear in a row more than 5 times. These filters lead
to a dataset of 2870 users that own a total of 5563 DSLR camera models. I find the data
patterns quite robust.
Industry Facts from Survey
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Figure 6.4: Number of Lenses Owned
Number of Lenses Owned  
• Respondents to this survey reported owning a mean of 3.3 lenses for their DSLRs. 
• Most respondents owned either one or two lenses. 
• Those who owned cameras costing more than $800 had a mean of 4.2 lenses. Meanwhile, 
DSLR owners who are planning to purchase another camera in the coming year owned a 
mean of 4.6 lenses. 
 
Figure 58: How many lenses do you own for your DSLR camera?  
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Figure 6.5: Compatibility of Lenses Owned
Usage of Lenses that were Owned Before Purchasing a DSLR 
• 54% of DSLR owners are using lenses that they obtained before they purchased their DSLR.  
This suggests that respondents are either using lenses that were purchased for a film SLR or 
that they previously owned lenses for a DSLR.  
Figure 59: How many of the lenses that you use with your DSLR did you own BEFORE you 
obtained your DSLR?  
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